New engagement strategy
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By Stephen Costello
The South Korean administration resumed loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts into North Korea on Jan. 9, and a U.S. B-52 Stratofortress flew over South Korea from Guam on Jan. 10. Both were in response to North Korea’s claim that it conducted an underground test of an H-Bomb. Both the H-bomb claim and an earlier video alleging development of a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) were judged to be fabrications by many experts. Nevertheless, it is assumed that progress on the technical work of development continues on the two weapons. Both are distinguished by their strategic futility, their low political cost, and the ease with which they will be understood by the North Koreans.
Judging from past experience, it will not be long before the DPRK responds to the loudspeakers. Already North Korean propaganda leaflets have drifted across the border. With so little of the kind of direct contact that might lead to another deal, the public is braced for more provocations in both directions, with no end in sight. In fact cooperating on a tension-reducing compromise is less likely than it was just four months ago, since a face-saving formula is less available.
In this environment of distrust and minimum diplomacy, which has gone on more or less since the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak in 2008, it’s difficult to imagine any bold return to larger-scale recognition of common interests. And it is entirely possible that this South Korean administration cannot make the effort required. But some government will. It may be the next one, or the one after that. As we’ve noted in this column several times before, other states don’t have the existential interest in South-North engagement that Seoul does. None of them is likely to do the heavy lifting required to bring these parties together.
A New engagement?
We should hope violence is avoided in coming weeks. Many experts are not optimistic. However, when talking is eventually resumed, what will South Korea’s role be? Perhaps the days when ROK leaders waited for the U.S. to take the lead on the North-South issues are over. In that case some planning will have to be done, and Seoul’s diplomatic and supporting ministries will have to think through the process. Diplomats will have to be ready to get back to work. And old plans might be dusted off, since many remain as relevant today as they were 10 years ago, or 15 years ago.
Whoever that Korean president is, he or she could and should lead Japan, the U.S. and China in a new initiative to address the main issues and put in place a mechanism for sustainable engagement, denuclearization, development and integration of North-South interests. The South Korean political scene, while difficult, should not be a threat to new initiatives.
The basket of freezes, inspections and other moves by the DPRK related to rolling back nuclear and WMD capabilities would be part of North-South discussions, just as they were during the 2000 and 2007 North-South summits. But the primary venue for that process would remain in the U.S.-DPRK channel. In this way, the ROK administration would be leading the U.S. back inevitably to an engagement posture, but within the clear context of supporting the ROK administration as a loyal ally, rather than altering course on its own. Capable messaging from the U.S. and ROK administrations could protect diplomatic space for new flexibility in reaction to peninsular developments. U.S. congressional opposition to strategic diplomacy with Iran and Cuba, over-wrought and under-thought, is a fair guide to how it will react to diplomacy with North Korea, so the White House must anticipate and confront it.
Principles of a new ROK initiative
Some basic principles could underpin a new South Korean initiative.
1. The ROK government should be the lead organizer of North-South, multilateral and NGO activities for the next decade. Eventually, the U.S., U.N. and IFIs will be fully contributing partners with the ROK, as will ASEAN, European governments and private companies. However, on matters of strategy, the ROK will be at the head of the table for the foreseeable future.
2. The Six-Party Talks framework will evolve into a new structure, and China will publicly and formally transfer convening authority to South Korea. Development and arms reduction will be the new primary goals, with security and denuclearization necessary conditions to be met if goals are to be realized.
3. Past North-South and Six Party agreements are to be explicitly respected. In both cases, however, there is sufficient room to incorporate key aspects into a new road map without being too legally or strictly bound to the texts.
4. The ROK will lead U.N. agencies and the IFIs from an early date in the comprehensive development of DPRK infrastructure. The U.S. will be welcomed to join the development aspects as it becomes comfortable, but will not be pressured. Any moves to adjust, suspend or lift U.N. sanctions should be led by the ROK or the U.N.
5. The U.N., International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. will coordinate closely with the ROK on implementation of freezes, inspections and dismantling related to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Sequencing this aspect with the development and political aspects will be the key to success, and the ROK must be the prime organizer.
6. The ROK will lead the Korean War Peace Treaty diplomacy with China, the U.S., the U.N., and other relevant governments. This diplomacy will proceed in semi-linked parallel with development and security aspects of the road map.
7. Trust will come from regular meetings, public commitments, signed agreements, and performance on the ground.
It may not be tomorrow, but the next successful North-South engagement will look something like this.
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a
Web and broadcast-based policy roundtable
focused on security, development and politics in
Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C.