South Korea's reputation
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By Stephen Costello
In East Asia, and particularly in Northeast Asia, South Korea has enjoyed a hard-earned respect for its comparatively nonviolent transition from authoritarianism and dictatorship to multi-party democracy. While mass public protests in the summer of 1987 forced the beginning of a transition to democratic structures, it was not until a decade later in 1997 that the opposition party ― and a long list of excluded groups ― finally won the opportunity to change the country’s power groups. Part of that change involved promoting and expanding the role of civil society. We are being reminded now in many other regions that these groups, NGOs, human rights, transparency, and good-government movements, are the oxygen that supports the life of a democracy.
It is not surprising that some see the younger generation, those in their 20s, as less aware of and less interested than their elders in Korea’s central national and regional dilemma: the North-South Korea divide. Strategic approaches by Korea and its closest ally, the US, were abandoned by the US administration in 2001 and by the Koreanadministration in 2008, in favor of short-term, misunderstood and tragically counter-productive inter-Korean policies. One inevitable consequence of success back then would have been that Korea would occupy a larger and growing peninsular and regional role.In that case, its democratic achievements would have been even more powerful and distinctive. Instead, Koreans for 14 years have grown up in a divided, contested and insecure political environment.
Most young Koreans do not remember either the impacts of lower tensions or the reasons why it made so much sense at the time. But they do care about the country’s democratic soul, its freedoms, and its participation in quicker and more inter-connected domestic and global relations.
For that reason, the focus on “polling” to support disinterest in the North-South dilemma by young people may miss the mark by a wide margin. Today’s Koreans are more aware of their neighborhood, and of their history, than many think. And they surely care about the country’s reputation ― in the region and around the world. After all, that reputation is part of the baggage they carry when they go abroad or engage with foreigners at home. Most probably understand the linkage between the failure to address the inter-Korean issues and political polarization at home. Do they really want to be answering questions about their government white-washing history, policing the Internet, or behaving too much like an authoritarian system, even while real undemocratic examples exist quite close by? Probably not.
Soft power has become a well-used and useful concept to describe the broad cultural, economic, and political attractiveness of a country. Joseph Nye helped us discuss something we already knew. Particularly combined with sufficient hard (military) power, soft power can allow leaders and administrations broad flexibility to engage in diplomatic and strategic efforts to enhance stability. Chinese soft power will always be limited by its systemic insecurity. Japanese soft power has been depleted during the Abe years due to efforts to rewrite history and a divisive approach to mainstream opinion. The South Korean administration has now joined them in spending down its reputation.
Yet, despite the limitations of current leaders in Seoul, Korea still has more potential flexibility, and more soft power, than its neighbors. The debates now in Korea are exploring the questions of if and how the next leaders there can use this latent power to address the big issues, reduce tensions, and regain the admiration of democrats everywhere. South Koreans will have to use the next two years to organize and open dialogues about the country’s profile, its compact between government, civil society and companies, its role on the Peninsula and in the region. There will be frustration that the administration cannot adjust more quickly, and cannot act sooner. We in the U.S. have had plenty of experience with that feeling.
But democracies can take time, and that’s better than the alternative. One hopes the authorities are taking lessons from the massive anti-administration demonstrations in Seoul on Nov. 14, the biggest in seven years. Instead of remembering how hard they fought for democratic progress, and the soft power now available to them, it would be possible for Korea’s leaders to take a different route. Alternative development models ― with far more violence and less security ― appear on front pages daily from Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa. If those with power and authority make the wrong choices, that is where South Korea, and the Northeast Asian region, are headed.
In today’s editorial, “South Korea Targets Dissent,” The New York Times pointed to President Park Guen-hye and her record. It noted in part, “The biggest risk to South Korea’s reputation abroad, however, is not economic but political, chiefly Ms. Park’s heavy-handed attempts to rewrite history and quash dissent.” That reputation is questioned now. It should be restored soon, but with what exactly?
In this context, it’s appropriate that U.S. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon continues to attempt a visit to North Korea. This is precisely what he should be doing. It would be best if he meets Kim Jong-un and arranges for the visit of UN human rights representatives. The hyper-speculation about the impact of this possible visit on Ban’s political future is revealing about Korea’s hunger for leadership, but not necessarily of Ban’s readiness for the big job. Compared to the Korean presidency, UN leadership may seem like a walk in the park.
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a Web
and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused
on security, development and politics in Northeast
Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be
contacted at cosetllos@asiaeast.org.