Perfect storm in Northeast Asia
.jpg?w=728)
By Stephen Costello
Five trends are converging in the northeast Asian region. If they provoke leaders to take up the growing challenges of security, economic integration and political deal-making, we may be in for very interesting times.
The times will be more interesting for the prospect that what happens in the next three to five years could distinguish this region from others ― the Middle East and Europe ― where dysfunction is likely to prevail for this same period.
Leaders may not emerge to capture the opportunities, and Xi Jinping will probably not provide the guidance needed. But developments are moving quickly, and possibilities for change are abundant. Each of these trends could have a profound impact on the region.
Increasing South Korean independence and regional agency: this may be difficult to perceive now, when the Korean president seems paralyzed by old world views, political ineptitude and a lack of practical vision, but the ingredients are clearly there. It was good that President Park went to Beijing, but her agenda was limited and lacked ambition.
It is easy to forget how far along Korea has come politically and economically since the first change of parties and power groups in 1998. Its potential power on the peninsula and in the region has grown even as political leaders have repeatedly mishandled the post-Cold War and new millennium opportunities before them.
The choices regarding Korea's identity are real, and they present the public and policy leaders with options full of long-term consequences in energy, diplomacy, development, and security.
The middle power (MP) reality of Japan, South Korea and Australia, and a growing MP identity. This trend is moving at different speeds in the three countries, and Australia may be the most advanced in talking about it. Although the concept has been around for many years it has now become a fact in many dimensions.
The tension between calibrated increases in independence and responsibility on the one hand, and their obvious requirements on the other, are now on the table in serious political debates. The Gillard government in Australia produced a long-term strategic white paper that partly evolved from its MP reality.
Japanese society is now far more engaged with questions of MP identity in the shadow of Shinzo Abe's brash independence and historical revisionism. Keio University's Soeya Yoshihide – mister middle power – has been particularly articulate about the concept.
And Korean political polarization has resulted in the search for a new, more independent and responsible identity being debated like never before.
The relative decline of U.S. diplomatic and military power in Northeast Asia. U.S. power will remain a key factor in the region, but the combined results from 15 years of George Bush's recklessness and Barack Obama's disinterest have left most of the leadership opportunities in the region still on the table.
The times when the US administration was either willing to propose an attractive vision or capable of doing so are over for now. The “rebalance” is more about preserving an old structure than working for a better one. A dumbing-down of US political and foreign policy discourse has also contributed to this trend.
The long-awaited official rethinking of U.S. relations with Iran and Cuba point to the future, and that is a big step forward.
But these two initiatives have also been a wake-up call, showing how difficult it has become for the U.S. administration to do the right thing abroad. Anything like the clearly “Democrat” foreign policy of even 15 years ago has collapsed. Now Democrats must be agonizingly convinced of the wisdom of what were not so long ago obvious, logical and strategically advantageous initiatives. For Northeast Asia, this condition will continue, and may even get worse, depending on the 2016 U.S. election.
Chinese aggressive nationalism together with its persistent vulnerabilities. As William Overholt notes about President Xi Jinping in the latest East Asia Forum Quarterly, “This is one of the most audacious gambits in modern history: taking on all the most powerful groups at the same, betting on leadership unity, a technocratic economic strategy, an anti-corruption campaign as the core political weapon, and a huge wave of popular political support mobilized by the anti-corruption campaign ... The Chinese team has bet the farm on a campaign against every important group simultaneously.”
Bullying and muscle-flexing in the East Sea and the South China Sea has provoked substantial push-back from countries in the area. Adjustments to a more wealthy and capable China will take time. The threat to democratic and quasi-democratic systems will be more forcefully resisted however, probably more than many observers expect. This is the battle that is long-term and affects daily lives.
It is ironic that the domestic control and consolidation that Xi requires to project power in the region also starves and restricts the system's attractiveness. This tension was evident at the recent 70th anniversary military parade in Beijing, where threatening displays of hardware competed with words of peace and promises of cooperation.
Increasing capability for infrastructure funding, and resulting political deals. China has been working hard at expanding infrastructure spending in the region, and much of that can be mutually beneficial, depending on the other participants and investors.
Open debates and lobbying over the standards and transparency of the new AIIB investment bank demonstrate the crying need for development and the hunger for responsible leadership to guide it.
In this environment, there is a great danger that trends toward a continued arms build-up, nuclear proliferation, territorial disputes and conservative nationalism will condemn the region to instability or worse in coming years. This danger should weigh heavily on those who plan to guide governments after the next elections.
Stephen Costello is producer of AsiaEast, a Web
and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused
on security, development and politics in Northeast
Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He
can be contacted at cosetllos@asiaeast.org.