Korea stumbles diplomatically
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By Stephen Costello
Many Koreans are worried that their government is missing out as diplomacy surrounding the Northeast Asian region accelerates and Korea seems less relevant. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe completed a mostly successful visit to the U.S. last week. Should Korea try to outdo Japan by appealing even more to the U.S. administration’s preferences and biases? Should it abandon hopes of improving relations with Japan, the U.S. and China for now, and concentrate on an opening with North Korea? Should it flood Washington with funding for new public relations firms, political consultants and NGOs?
It is true that Korea’s position is unclear right now. Koreans are also correct to worry about their government’s plans and even its outlook and overall strategy to advance the country’s interests with its ally and neighbors. But none of the actions proposed in columns and editorials noted above would address the core issues that have led to the situation. Instead, the overall Korean posture toward the neighborhood and its U.S. alliance is the place to focus. This could be called the national identity, both bottom-up and led from the top.
Full democracy began in seriousness only when the parties and interest-groups finally changed hands in 1998. Korea is in that way a 17-year-old democracy. Since then, because of a combination of internal and external factors, this will mean 10 years of divided progressive government and 10 years of more consistent conservative government. If Koreans are going to push for more clarity and more capable leaders, they had better know where they are going and what it will take to get there.
Choices must be made. Good politics should be about choices. A lucky society is presented with stark and well-argued options. The quality of those choices in Korea will depend on the various political parties and on the news media. With Assembly elections next year and a presidential election in 2017, everyone should focus on the choices ahead.
Choice one — a chaebol-dominated, neo-liberal economy with a minimum social safety net and low standards of public support, opportunity and cohesion, or a more entrepreneurial economy, with increasing and smart regulation?
Choice two — a nuclear-first, high-cost and dangerous energy policy, or a national turn to technology-centered renewable and cleaner options as soon as feasible.
Choice three — an unending arms race, including cruise missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, missile defense and hardware maximization, and a just-below-weapons nuclear industry, or an upgraded but moderate defense capability, linked to reduced threats and costs through diplomacy.
Choice four — a desperate and undignified scramble for Washington’s favor, an immature and self-defeating stand-off with the Japanese prime minister, an engaged but confusing relationship with China, and a contradictory and unrealistic stand toward North Korea, or a Seoul-led re-evaluation of interests and realistic options, and a convincing turn toward diplomatic activism and strategic goal-setting.
These are some of the choices that would address the regional diplomatic environment. There are no quick solutions. President Park Geun-hye decided more than two weeks ago against going to Moscow on May 9 to take advantage of her own and Korea’s position with other attendees at the celebration of the end of World War II. Now the North Korean leader has also decided not to attend. Plans are still in place for Park to go to Washington this summer.
In the wake of Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Washington, many of the wrong questions are being asked of Korea, Japan and the U.S. For instance, do Koreans really need another apology from Abe? No. They need to find a way around him to engage with the majority of Japanese and the interests they share with Korea. And Koreans need to work with him, somehow, on a range of urgent issues not related to security.
For that matter, do Korea or Japan really distrust the U.S. capability or willingness to stand with them against an aggressor or bully in the near future? No. That “worry” is mythological. It is more likely both conservative ruling groups fear the countryevolution toward greater positive independence from their ally, and the greater responsibility that will demand.
Does Japan need to “lead” the region militarily? No. More likely, the Japanese majority’s dislike of a leading military role can be respected, even while most of the new U.S.-Japan guidelines are slowly implemented.
Does the U.S. need to demand and expect loyalty to whichever world view and set of tactical interests the administration has prioritized? No. In fact, it may be time the U.S. began to trust the basic interests and capabilities of its two allies more, and listen a bit more, so that they could expand the depth of common interests with the U.S. in the region.
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank experience was not an exception. It was perfectly consistent with Washington world views, and it should alert U.S. thinkers to better and more practical approaches.
Stephen Costello is producer of AsiaEast, a Web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He previously directed the Korea program at the Atlantic Council of the U.S. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be contacted at cosetllos@asiaeast.org.