Caution is best response to N. Korea's positive gesture
By Arthur I. Cyr
“A small but meaningful step” is how a senior official of South Korea’s Unification Ministry described the surprise visit Oct. 4 of top North Korean officials. Hwang Pyong-so, close adviser to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, headed the delegation which crossed the Demilitarized Zone.
The officials from Pyongyang arrived the same day as the closing ceremony of the Asian Games, hosted by South Korea. The games overall had been a major success. The Seoul government handled the ambitious complex project for a fraction of the cost incurred by China in hosting the last Asian Games or Russia in hosting the Winter Olympics earlier this year.
The North-South talks also ended amicably, and television cameras captured rare smiles and jovial comments between the two sides. There was agreement to meet again soon.
The relationship between the two Koreas has been uncertain and erratic for years, punctuated by short bursts of sporadic violence. In February, there was a reunion in North Korea of previously separated families, a humanitarian event carrying profound symbolism. Yet in early July, Pyongyang reacted with outrage to the South Korean visit of new China President Xi Jinping, who has not yet visited the North.
Last year, North Korea announced a “state of war” with South Korea and threatened nuclear attacks. Pyongyang abruptly abrogated the 1953 armistice agreement ending the Korean War, and cut the military “hot line’’ communications link with the South.
The North then temporarily prevented South Korean workers from entering the Gaeseong industrial center, located six miles north of the DMZ. The center is an important source of hard currency for the desperately poor economy of North Korea.
This threatening shift for some seemed to presage war, yet there was never any concrete evidence North Korea was mobilizing to invade South Korea. Moreover, Pyongyang’s nuclear military capabilities remain extremely rudimentary. Missile tests have included some limited success, but also dramatic failures.
Continuing policy u-turns also imply a behind-the-scenes struggle for power. In July 2012, senior leader Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho was relieved of command, allegedly due to illness. This explanation was generally discounted. He had been an ally of leader Kim, whose absence from public view currently is causing much debate.
Kim publicly criticized military officers “developing a taste for money’’ amid reports of corruption. As part of the shakeup which followed, Kim assumed the rank of Marshal of the People’s Army. His supportive uncle Jang Song-thaek was abruptly arrested and executed last December, followed reportedly by other killings.
In March 2010, a North Korean torpedo sank the South Korean ship Cheonan. In the same vicinity in November of that year, North Korean artillery bombarded South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island.
In late February 2012, North Korea agreed once more to cease their on-again, off-again nuclear program. In joint announcements coordinated with the U.S. Department of State, the regime agreed to halt uranium enrichment and permit international inspection. Yet two months later, Pyongyang tested a missile.
The isolation of the surviving communist state provides an opportunity for Washington and Seoul to strengthen ties with Beijing, North Korea’s crucial ideological ally and economic supporter.
South Korean President Park Geun-hye has remained calm and consistent in emphasizing strong military defense and also the possibility of cooperation. She personifies South Korea as a formidable, effective and sensible ally.
The lack of disciplined, sustained U.S. leadership underscores South Korea’s importance.
Arthur I. Cyr is Clausen Distinguished Professor at Carthage College and author of "After the Cold War.’’ He can be reached at acyr@carthage.edu.