Obama's trip to Asian allies amid Ukraine crisis
By Andrew Hammond
Barack Obama touches down Wednesday in Japan, where he starts an important weeklong trip that will also take him to three other countries: South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines. His overriding goal will be to re-assure these allies about enduring U.S. commitments, while sending a clear message to neighboring states, including China, about the U.S. intent to maintain its Asia-Pacific pivot.
This is a simple, but crucial message at a time of significant geopolitical turbulence and tension ― both in the region and beyond. The trip, for instance, comes at a moment when U.S. foreign policy attention remains diverted by events in Ukraine which many in the Asia-Pacific are also watching closely as a potential signal for how Washington might respond to future Chinese belligerence.
However, the need for U.S. reassurance comes in a broader context of the postponement of Obama’s planned Asian trip last autumn during the U.S. government shutdown. And also substantial regional change in the last 12-18 months, which has seen a once-in-a-generation transition of leadership in China, the subsequent rise of a more assertive Beijing; plus the election of the conservative, nationalist Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The fluid, unpredictable environment this has generated has caused continual headaches for Washington since Obama was re-elected in 2012.
Indeed, the president currently faces the most significant array of obstacles toward realizing his goals in the Asia-Pacific than at any other time during his period in the White House. For instance, progress toward securing the landmark Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement may be stalling, despite Washington’s ambition to secure a deal in 2014 that could comprise at least 12 countries that collectively account for around 40 percent of the world GDP.
Moreover, there are significant bilateral tensions, including those between Japan and South Korea (Washington’s two leading regional allies), which Obama is fire-fighting. Only last month, he made some potentially important progress here at the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague where a three-way meeting with Abe and South Korean President Park Geun-hye was the first high-level contact between the countries for months.
As in much of East Asia, underlying bilateral tensions between Seoul and Tokyo reflect the legacy of a troubled past which continues to powerfully shape attitudes and behavior. In this instance, there is significant remaining distrust and anger from the period when Korea was under Japanese rule, including as an annexed colony from 1910 to 1945.
These issues have been given new impetus by the election of Abe whose conservative, nationalist agenda seeks to emphasize greater pride in the country’s past, and also overturn remaining legal and political underpinnings of the country’s post-World War II pacifist security identity, so that it can become more actively engaged internationally. While this posture is largely aimed at countering Beijing’s growing power, it has alarmed Seoul too.
Of course, these deep-seated problems are not ones that Washington can fully resolve in the short to medium term, but careful management of them is the key to realizing U.S. objectives. In both Tokyo and Seoul, Obama will thus stress the importance of enduring U.S. partnership with each country, including against aggression from external parties, while continuing to promote a common trilateral agenda, including toward the North Korean nuclear threat, to build trust and reconciliation.
Obama’s agenda in Malaysia and the Philippines, two key members of ASEAN, will also focus on strengthening alliances. And once again, reassurance is key given regional concerns that Washington’s interest in Southeast Asia could dwindle if U.S. relations with China improve significantly.
There is currently considerable distrust of China within many ASEAN countries, not least over territorial and natural resource claims in the South China Sea. Late last year, for instance, Beijing refused to participate in a U.N. arbitration process over a territorial conflict with the Philippines.
In this context, Manila is keen to strengthen ties with Washington, and this will be formalized during the trip with the signing of a U.S.-Philippine defense cooperation treaty. Reportedly, this will enable greater rotation through the country of U.S. ships, sharing of local bases, and aircraft and troops.
In Malaysia, Obama will be the first U.S. president to visit in some 50 years, and the moment is opportune with Kuala Lumpur assuming the ASEAN chair in 2015. He is likely to find his Malaysian hosts particularly welcoming in light of the recent deterioration in relations with China since the disappearance of flight MH370.
Taken overall, the president has a clear and substantial agenda in each country, but his overarching ambition will be to provide re-assurance about enduring U.S. commitments to the region on the security, economic and political fronts. Moreover, with a TPP deal still uncertain, Obama may be able to unlock key issues to advance what would be a potentially game-changing agreement cementing U.S. influence in the region well beyond Obama’s presidency.
Andrew Hammond is a former U.K. special adviser in the government of Tony Blair, and an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.