North Korea‘s outmoded nuclear philosophy

By Seongjin J. Ahn

After yet another failed rocket launch on April 13, there is little doubt that North Korea will continue in its pursuit of nuclear technology and their ability to project that threat. Despite changing international norms, the North still clings to an outdated notion of the benefits and prestige once associated with nuclear weapons.

Ironically, the regime's long obsession for developing some of the world’s most advanced weapons technology is accompanied by rather primitive philosophy. Developing and possessing nuclear weapons is no longer regarded as a reputable or prestigious pursuit as it was in the 20th century when it used to imply a number of desirable state traits. First, that a state is wealthy enough to support the billions of dollars required for developing the weapons. Second, that it has the domestic talent bright enough and technology advanced enough to create them. Third, that it has a political cache sophisticated enough to live up to its newly elevated status in international affairs. North Korea, after all of its efforts, has achieved none of the above.

But for an exceptionally insecure country like North Korea in which mere state survival is of utmost concern, status and prestige are not likely to be as vital as, perhaps, a fourth benefit provided by atomic weapons: nuclear deterrence, or the means to prevent adversaries from attacking.

While it may come as a surprise to the North’s leadership, in today's post-Cold War era the opposite predominantly rings true of nuclear weapons and developing or possessing them is perceived as an endeavor with costly consequences. As in the case of North Korea and Iran in recent events, countries that pursue the bomb are isolated from the international community, often becoming the target of international sanctions and U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Moreover, they have a reputation for having oppressive governments and grossly misallocating resources at the cost of the welfare of their people. Most strikingly, even the benefit of nuclear deterrence is now viewed by experts as a double-edged sword. Contrary to the belief that nuclear weapons ensure national security, experts have argued that the acquisition of nuclear weapons only increases a state’s security dilemma. In other words, the moment a state acquires nuclear weapons is the moment it becomes a target of other nuclear powers.

The Cuban missile crisis is a crude reminder that the United States was once Russia's main nuclear target, and vice-versa. Disputed regions in Kashmir are contemporary reminders that Pakistan and India are in each other's cross-hairs, and Iran's recent pursuit of nuclear weapons is arguably an attempt to balance Israel's atomic threat in the region. Whereas countries like South Africa and Ukraine, that have stated they once pursued the bomb, are not under any threat of nuclear attack. The advantage of nuclear deterrence can't be completely disregarded, however, provided that countries with nuclear weapons ― including North Korea ― have never been invaded.

All this begs the question, how then has the nuclear imperative been redefined? Today, there is now more recognition to be found for countries that are enlightened enough to relinquish their nuclear pursuits, or to provide leadership in the non-proliferation movement.

In light of 189 countries signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States, in collaboration with Russia, has helped redefine the old notion that nuclear weapons are a panacea for state survival or prestige by signing the Nuclear Arms Reduction Pact in 2010. It's up for debate whether estimable progress towards the pact has been made but the fact that two global military superpowers would lead the world in a new nuclear philosophy has undoubtedly changed the game.

In light of all this, however, it is unlikely that Pyongyang will have an epiphany any time soon. In his first public speech, Kim Jong-un once again touted military preeminence in North Korea. So long as this is the case, nuclear warheads will continue to be an important sign of omnipotent military power for the country, and their possession will still be viewed as a valuable strategic bargaining chip in international negotiations. And, as outdated as their nuclear philosophy may be, the bomb will remain for them the unchallenged symbol of assured deterrence.

The writer graduated with a master's degree from New York University.