Intransigence in N. Korea policy
By Tong Kim
In the midst of a significantly shifting security environment in Northeast Asia ― with the confirmation of Kim Jong-un as the next leader of North Korea, China’s remarkable rise in power, assertiveness and influence, and the cementing of a ``lips and teeth” relationship between China and the DPRK, the United States needs to reassert its leadership with a new strategy to protect its interest in the Korean peninsula and the region. The U.S. seems to have abandoned its leadership role that its friends respected and its foes recognized in the past.
While taking no clear position on the North’s succession issue, Washington just wants to wait and see how the process would unfold or what impact the process might have on its relations with the South and the United States. On the prospect of denuclearization, Washington still sticks to its passive strategy of waiting for Pyongyang to show a genuine willingness to comply with its commitment to the 2005 and 2007 agreements. Recently, Washington added a new condition for reengaging Pyongyang: improved inter-Korean relations. The United States is also waiting for the South to improve relations with the North.
Washington’s ``strategic patience” has so far yielded no progress on denuclearization, but it has certainly strengthened the U.S.-ROK alliance, especially since the sinking of the Cheonan ship. Seoul has not dropped its demand for a North Korean apology and punishment of those responsible for torpedoing the South Korean naval ship as a necessary condition for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue. Seoul knows that the North would not accept its demand. Yet, unless the Cheonan issue is somehow resolved to the South’s satisfaction, there is no chance for improved inter-Korean relations, therefore, no prospect for restarting the six-party talks.
By last week’s revelation of China’s GDP for the second quarter of the year 2010, China has surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest economic power only next to the United States. During a recent territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands, Japan surrendered to China’s demand for the release of a Chinese boat captain. China even used economic pressure, while demanding a Japanese apology for the ``illegal detention” of the Chinese citizen. China firmly rejects U.S. pressure to appreciate its undervalued currency. Recently Beijing also complained about U.S. naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, Whether the United States would actually deploy the aircraft carrier George Washington in a combined U.S.-ROK exercise in the West Sea remains to be seen.
China, along with Russia, has not accepted the conclusion of an international investigation report holding the North responsible for sinking the ship Cheonan in March, killing 46 South Korean sailors. Beijing invited North Korean leader Kim Jong-il twice to visit China since the Cheonan incident. Beijing has endorsed Kim Jong-un as the heir-apparent and invited him to visit China at a convenient time for him. China has become the largest trading partner of the North, practically sustaining the North’s economic lifeline. From all indications, Sino-North Korean relations seem to have never been better in recent years.
China still wants to revive the multilateral denuclearization talks, based on its understanding of Pyongyang’s interest in the nuclear talks. However, Seoul and Washington would require some demonstration of deeds that Pyongyang is prepared to go beyond rhetoric. What the North should do to be credible has never been spelled out. But, the problem is that no participant in the six-party talks has the confidence that the talks would lead to the successful denuclearization of North Korea.
Only less than a month ago, the North Korean vice foreign minister told the United Nations that Pyongyang’s ``nuclear deterrent can never be abandoned, but should be strengthened further,” as long as it is threatened by the United States. As a de facto nuclear weapons state, he added that the DPRK is ready to support international efforts for non-proliferation and for the safeguards of nuclear material.”
An increasing number of skeptics question the utility of the six-party talks. Some of them argue that Washington should come up with a new strategy to deal with the Korean Peninsula issue on the assumption that Kim Jong-il would never give up his nuclear weapons. Some others believe Washington should wait until the next DPRK leadership is settled in place, hoping that it would be more open to constructive negotiation. However, there is no assurance of when the next leader would have the full authority to deal with the nuclear issue or if he would be more open.
Others argue that the United States should be prepared for a possible crisis of instability that may lead to the collapse of the North Korean regime. Still other people are stressing that there should be multilateral efforts to secure and dispose nuclear weapons and fissile materials in the North in the event of a regime collapse. The U.S. and ROK forces have already redeveloped Concept Plan 5029, part of which is practiced in their annual exercises. Some argue that other U.S. agencies such as State, Energy and Homeland Security departments should also be involved in the development and implementation of a comprehensive contingency plan. The problems with this idea are: (1) there is no evidence that supports the collapsibility of North Korea and (2) China would never participate in the discussion of such a contingency plan, albeit China is interested in what the United States plans to do in such an event.
There is a growing concern over South Korea’s strained relationship with China. Many in Seoul, on the left and the right, are uneasy about the retreat of U.S. leadership on the North Korean issue. Is the United States ``outsourcing” South Korea for the resolution of the nuclear issue, knowing it would not work? Washington’s intransigent ``policy of waiting” would only lead to more waiting and more delay in denuclearization. It is important the United States reassert its leadership role in the region, beyond consultation with its allies. What’s your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.