Will Scuds Fly?

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By Allen Bauer

No discussion on North Korean militarism would be appropriate without inserting a popular euphemistic cliche. ``Saber rattling'' ― the intent is to suggest that North Korea's bark is worse than its bite, and that most of North Korea's posturing is childishly designed to attract international attention in order to garner economic concessions.

There I've done it and I won't mention ``saber rattling'' again.

What may have been true back in 1994 isn't necessarily so, these days. Information exchange has exploded, the technological gap has narrowed substantially since then and global economies have been redefined; North Korean strategies have been redrawn imperceptibly as well.

The fact is, Kim Jong-il no longer gives a flying flip about our concessions, our U.N. drafted resolutions or our sanctions, except to the extent that they might temporarily inhibit his real agenda: to develop a practical nuclear delivery system.

He may go through the motions of sitting down for a multilateral chitchat, every now and then, but no amount of mediation will really deter him from his ultimate goal. So much for the Sunshine Policy.

Why should he allow himself to be deterred? Kim Jong-il has nothing to lose and everything to gain by establishing his country as a viable nuclear force in the region. Today, North Korea is a bit like a pauper sitting at a high rollers' card table. It can't even scratch up table stakes.

A nuclear warhead, however, would be like holding a royal flush through every hand. Everybody would fold most of the time.

The bottom line is, Kim Jong-il would have to be a complete idiot not to pursue a nuclear agenda, and we have to give the man credit for that much ― he isn't a complete idiot.

At present, according to South Korean and U.S. intelligence estimates, North Korea has at least 600 Scuds that could be deployed in short order. The Scuds are a real and ever-present danger.

To give you an idea, on January 18, 1991, Iraq launched just seven Scuds on Haifa (Israel's major seaport) destroying about 1,500 apartments and causing enormous human injury. Of course Israel, the U.S. and the U.K. responded adeptly and the immediate threat was neutralized.

Israel actually fired off a nuclear-capable (unarmed) missile as a warning shot, just to give Iraq a little something extra to think about.

North Korea has a battery of conventional missiles available besides the short-range Scuds. The Rodong is a proprietary North Korean device that doubles the range of the Scud, placing Japan within target radius.

North Korea has been quite successful, as well, in marketing Rodong technology to Pakistan and Iran (where the missile was renamed the Ghauri-2 and Shahab-3 by each customer, respectively) ― just on a side note, so you can see, DPRK doesn't make all its money by selling drugs or printing counterfeit dollars.

Then we have the Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 missile architectures with ranges of 2,500 and 6,600 kilometers respectively. These devices bring into a play a variety of targets in Asia.

Nothing yet has been developed to put the continental U.S. in the kill zone although North Korea is said to have an ``advanced'' Taepodong-2 in the works which, it is believed, would place America's west coast within range.

As it stands now, the Scuds remain the real threat to South Korea. Because of their short range, low altitude trajectories and easy mobility, these missiles are difficult to neutralize using antiballistic (ABM) technologies.

The standard and most effective military response is to deploy a blanket of fighter aircraft into enemy territory in order to hunt down and destroy roaming Scud launchers. South Korea and its allies have the current air force capability to do that very efficiently, and the end result would be politically disastrous for the North.

And so, the Scuds will never fly from North Korean launchers onto South Korean soil, at least not as long as a South Korean-allied military response remains imminent.

However, insert a few nuclear warheads into the decision-making process (irreparably upsetting the balance of power) and serious retaliation becomes unlikely if not impossible.

Will Scuds fly, if North Korea is allowed to continue developing a nuclear deterrent? Let's rephrase that question: Do bears defecate in the forest?

Allen Bauer is a Canadian citizen who has lived and worked in Korea as a teacher for seven years. He has degrees in electrical engineering and social psychology. He also has a French baccalaureat in literature and philosophy. He can be reached at koreaspeak@gmail.com.

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