Long Overdue Step
By Dave H. Kim
The Lee Myung-bak administration announced on Tuesday that South Korea will join the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a fully participating member.
The announcement comes after years of having shunned active participation in PSI during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, despite repeated requests from Washington, due to concerns of aggravating North Korea.
The North's nuclear test and missile launches on Monday seem to have been the last deciding factors that nudged the administration.
Seoul's decision to join the PSI is the right step that had been delayed for too long. Firstly, it is a logical decision. It should not surprise anyone ― not even Pyongyang ― that South Korea's Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan described the decision as ``a natural obligation'' when one considers North Korea's recent actions.
The provocative actions included the long-range rocket launch in April; the detainment of a South Korean worker at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex; the expulsion of U.S. nuclear experts and U.N. inspectors; a threat to halt the operation of the inter-Korean industrial park; and the second nuclear test, accompanied by three more short-range missiles.
To North Korean leaders, the recent provocations may simply have been business-as-usual brinkmanship in their continuing efforts to gain economic and diplomatic concessions. But observers can also view the actions as North Korea painting itself into a diplomatic corner.
Pyongyang continued to take unjustified and unmatched steps to raise the stakes, while Seoul and Washington eventually chose the poised path of diplomacy and consensus-building that resulted in the U.N. Security Council's statement of condemnation for the missile launches in April.
It is well known that President Lee departed from his two predecessors and had been leaning toward full PSI membership. If anything, for the conservative Lee administration, not joining PSI would have been more inconsistent.
The second reason to join PSI is the seriousness of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. PSI was created in 2003 by the U.S. in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and a North Korean vessel carrying Scud missiles was stopped in the Middle East waters by Spanish warships in 2002.
The exposure of A.Q. Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan's nuclear program, revealed that Pakistan traded nuclear technology with North Korea in return for ballistic missile technology.
Despite the gravity of WMD proliferation and while more than 90 countries had joined PSI, South Korea rebuffed its closest ally and much of the global community and failed to give nonproliferation its due priority in foreign policy.
Real consequences have been only minor strains on relations with South Korea's allies and friends. But for a rapidly advancing country that takes national image very seriously, it had failed to portray to much of the world an image of a significant country concerning nonproliferation of WMD.
Lastly, in line with other policy decisions by the Lee administration, joining PSI will strengthen Seoul's bilateral relations with Washington. Regardless of one's political orientation, it is indisputable that relations had cooled significantly during the two previous administrations.
Most Americans, both Republicans and Democrats, had been confused by South Korean attempts to distance itself from its ally of five decades in order to cater to its ``primary enemy."
Following the 2006 ballistic missile test and the subsequent U.N. Security Council Resolution 1695 that condemned North Korea, Washington and Tokyo reconstituted economic sanctions against North Korea.
Two days later, Roh was critical of American and Japanese actions and was quoted as saying, ``since they [the U.S.] are an ally, we cannot scold them, but we have to go at it with Japan.''
Such careless comments by South Korean leaders suggested to Americans that many Koreans placed ``shared blood'' (North Korea) above ``spilled blood'' (the U.S.), which some describe as emotion trumping over reason.
Changes within Korea and in the international arena rightfully demand changes to the close relations begun in the 1950s. The need for change, however, does not mean the relations are no longer important.
The alliance with the U.S. was essential for South Korea to focus on and achieve rapid growth, while devoting only moderate resources on national defense, and this is still the case today.
And despite South Korea's growing trade with China and other countries, the U.S. is still the second largest export market and source of foreign direct investment.
South Korea's entry into PSI as a participating member may amount to a little more than a symbolic victory without China and India, the two notable holdouts. Nevertheless, South Korea's decision to join the rest of the world is the right decision, and one that was long overdue.
Dave H. Kim was formerly a research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in international relations at Korea University in Seoul. His research interests include North Korea's nuclear issue, South Korea's security identity, and inter-Korea relations. He can be reached at davehkim@korea.ac.kr.