India, Pakistan and Taliban
By Seema Sengupta
KOLKATA ― The official acceptance of Sufi Mohammad's pro-Taliban outfit Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi as the virtual lawmaker for the formerly princely state of Swat in Pakistan symbolizes the gradual radicalization of the entire country.
The negotiated surrender of this scenic district bordering Afghanistan is a clear reflection of the Pakistani security establishment's unwillingness to confront the fanatics in a volatile zone.
This is precisely the reason why the Indian government is still wary of Pakistan's real intent after the 26/11 terror attack in Mumbai. In order to achieve parity with India, Islamabad has been using the Afghan front as an instrument for attaining long-sought-after strategic depth.
The Pakistani leadership in fact volunteered to be the frontline state during the Cold War. Their objective was to install a compliant regime in Kabul that will provide the much-needed strategic space to counter Indian hegemony in the region.
Afghan domination was extremely vital for exercising control over the southern corridor leading to Central Asia and a way to enhance Pakistan's geopolitical standing.
The Taliban is a product of this strategic vision. However, the sustained proliferation of arms, narcotics and trained fanatics has taken its toll on Pakistan's morbid economy.
Interestingly, nobody in Pakistan seems to realize that the nation is alienating even its trusted allies in the quest for strategic depth and regional supremacy.
Islamabad has yet to wriggle out of the Cold War mindset or else it would not have antagonized neighboring Iran by instigating the Taliban to decimate ex-Afghan President Burhaneddine Rabbani's Teheran-backed coalition.
Seeking to use China's leverage in condoning the Mumbai attack was also a big blunder. Pakistan must reconcile itself with a drastically altered world scenario after the gruesome 9/11 attacks on American targets.
Otherwise it would squander the great opportunity to merge with the global economy. Deeper bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors and the landlocked energy rich states born of the womb of the erstwhile Soviet Union will undoubtedly boost the beleaguered Pakistani economy.
A moderate Pakistan devoid of fanatical insurgents can be more lucrative to potential investors as a conduit to Central and South Asia. The current generation of Pakistani leadership figures should therefore avoid getting trapped in risky illusions like their forefathers.
It is practically impossible for a developing nation to sustain such costly strategic games without the provision of adequate resources. In the interests of permanent peace in South Asia, Pakistan should adopt a reformist approach instead.
Moreover, the very idea of maintaining friendly proximity with a retrograde movement is fallacious in itself. By promoting a concept lacking in ethics, aesthetics, humanism and moderation so intricately associated with traditional Islam, Pakistani rulers are actually fortifying the blemished notion of the great religion being prone to terrorism.
It also paves the way for mobilization of ethnic nationalism and militant religious movements that might disturb the very foundation of the Pakistani state.
New Delhi, on the other hand, is in the process of formulating a counter-strategy in view of recent developments and the passive U.S. support to Pakistan on the Swat deal.
In addition, the exclusion of India from the recently established tri-nation axis between the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan to deal with regional security issues has significant geopolitical connotations.
With the Taliban a stone's throw away from India's doorstep, some policymakers believe that New Delhi should play a proactive role in Afghanistan militarily as a policy of containment.
However, India's role in Afghanistan can be determined only after assessing the ground situation across the Hindu Kush Mountains thoroughly.
After all, the treacherous terrains of Afghanistan and the tribal areas in Pakistan have traditionally been used by various countries as a launch pad for subversive activities directed against respective adversaries.
The phenomenon of political Islam spreading in India's immediate neighborhood also requires careful analysis before formulating a counter-strategy.
Exposing the Taliban's internal functioning is an essential prerequisite for insulating Indian society from the Taliban's cultural onslaught.
That the Taliban is completely alienated from true Islamic values must be highlighted effectively. Using the mainstream militants against ultras might be another option for the Indian state.
Thus, New Delhi should judiciously examine the nature of the Taliban's threat given the fact that Indian agencies have consistently nurtured selective Pakhtun elements within the hardcore Taliban leadership.
The Afghan crisis is indeed interwoven into complicated strands of contradictory factors that baffled even the shrewdest of strategists.
Though the Pakhtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan are traditional supporters of India, having actively participated in India's freedom movement, New Delhi has no influence over a powerful section of the warring tribes.
Any form of military involvement without properly charting out the exit route will inevitably end up in a fiasco similar to the one that the Indian Army faced in war torn Sri Lanka in the mid-80s.
Finally, the Indian leadership should be apprised of the reality in Afghanistan. The absence of a direct land border will always force New Delhi to play second fiddle in the Afghan cauldron whatever the public posturing may be.
Seema Sengupta is a journalist based in Kolkata, India. Her articles have been published by The Tribune, The Telegraph, The Pioneer, The Asian Age and other newspapers. She can be reached at seemasengupta@vsnl.net.