Exporting Saemaul Movement

By Elijah N. Munyi

Korea's rapid economic development over the last three decades of the 20th century has been deservedly hailed as globally preeminent.

Concurrent to national growth was growth in rural incomes and agricultural production. It follows that Korea's policymaking for rural development was outstanding.

Some experts have thus floated the idea of exporting the concept of Saemaul Undong, or New Community Movement, as Korea's most unique development strategy, proposing that Korea's knowledge sharing program teaches the concept in other countries, particularly Africa.

Exporting Saemaul Undong to other places would certainly enhance Korea's profile abroad, but would it work for rural development?

In my view exporting Saemaul Undong won't necessarily work. This paper sets out the policy and political changes within individual countries and the international system that complicates Saemaul Undong's application and prospects in Africa.

Saemaul undong was initiated as a movement seeking community development and modernization. Although the policy had political and spiritual appendages it was essentially a rural development policy hinged on subsidization of farming through the high rice price policy.

In the nine years between 1970 and 1979, rural households' agricultural income in Korea grew six times from approximately 255,800 won to 1,531,300 Won. This rapid growth in rural incomes has been attributed in large part to the Saemaul Undong policy.

In addition, Korea's ethnic cohesion and traditional value of cooperative working fostered the success of Saemaul Undong.

It is in fact the parallels between these Korean traditional values and Africa's own communal values such as ujamaa (Tanzanian concept of `pooling together like a single family') and harambee (Kenyan concept for `let's do together') that have prompted some Korean scholars to think of the suitability of Saemaul Undong in Africa.

Yet in spite of these shared communal values, why will Saemaul Undong not work in Africa?

Politics

To begin with, African politics has moved beyond ideological fascination and sloganeering. Saemaul Undong works best under a wave of strong political mobilization by a political leader who galvanizes a whole country behind one central cause.

Usually this happens under highly centralized monolithic political systems with minimum political opposition. Political success in mobilization is to a large extent dependent on a leader's longevity in his leadership position.

Thus, Saemaul Undong benefited from President Park Chung-hee's long tenure in office and in fact began to falter immediately after his assassination in spite of greater public funding.

Democratic leadership is by nature short-lived and less authoritative in its ability to single-handedly effect national decisions.

As democracy takes root in Africa so will it be more difficult for Saemaul Undong to be effective due to executive weakness. Few African leaders today have such powerful mobilizational resources as Park Chung-hee had in the 1970s in Korea.

Economics

The operative strategy of any rural development policy is the subsidization of agriculture. In Korea, price distortion was the real fortress for Saemaul Undong as the high rice price-policy guaranteed a market for rice at considerably good prices. Bans on rice importation ensured a steady domestic market.

The most important question therefore in exporting Saemaul Undong inspired ideas for rural development is to ask the question: To what extent are governments able to guarantee markets for agricultural products and to provide subsides for farming inputs?

The policy capacities of African economies today are markedly weaker than those of Korea in the 1970s. The liberalization of agricultural markets in African countries in the 1980s-90s has dramatically reduced African governments' capacity for price control.

A high price policy would hardly be feasible. In addition, use of quotas, bans and tariffs for import restriction is constrained by regulations of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Secondly, Korea and most African countries have unparalleled differences in diversity of crops produced which makes subsidization more difficult in Africa. In 1967, 70 percent of farm households in Korea were rice farmers.

Thus government concentration on subsidizing just one food crop (rice) was virtually nationally comprehensive for all farmers. However, African farming is widely diverse and characterized by a multiplicity of food and cash crops that exclude any one majority crop.

Any choice of one or a short list of crops for augmented production or marketing would be hampered by this multiplicity. Any African agricultural subsidization would have to be comprehensive in choice of crops for support.

The objectives of Knowledge Sharing Programs (KSPs), of the Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation Conference (KOAFEC) and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) should not just be about sharing Korean development experience.

It should be about imparting feasible and usable knowledge. Actual implementation of Saemaul Undong at a national level is a long shot policy for most African countries today.

Elijah N. Munyi is a researcher for African economies at the Korea Institute for Development Strategy (KDS) in Seoul. He can be reached at: menyaga2000@yahoo.com.