What options remain for Korea in Hormuz after Lee rules out war involvement?
President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a press conference at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul, Friday, when he raised the possibility of expanding the role of the Cheonghae Unit to contribute to safe navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Yonhap
Experts outline expanded Cheonghae role along with importance of timing, independent command
President Lee Jae Myung’s decision to rule out sending troops for combat in the U.S.-Iran war is drawing attention to what Seoul can still do in and around the Strait of Hormuz without joining the fighting.
The remaining options range from expanding the role of the Cheonghae Unit, a Korean naval contingent operating in waters around the Gulf of Aden focused primarily on anti-piracy and vessel-protection missions, to maritime surveillance and logistical support, according to analysts.
They said whether such options would allow Korea to stay out of the war would depend on where and when the country’s military forces are deployed, what missions they take on and whether they remain under Seoul’s command.
“It is important that the Cheonghae Unit remains under independent Korean command and focuses on protecting Korean vessels and nationals, rather than becoming involved in combat operations,” said Cho Yong-geun, a professor of military studies at Kyungnam University.
He added that “if it is after the war ends, there would be no problem” with expanding the unit’s operations toward the strait.
The professor’s remarks came as Seoul faces continued pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump to contribute to efforts to secure freedom of navigation through the strait amid the months-long war with Iran.
Trump has repeatedly called on allies to play a greater role, with no allies so far committing to direct military involvement.
At a press conference Friday, Lee drew a clear line at combat involvement, saying Korea would not send troops to “participate or intervene in the war,” while leaving room for other military activities to protect Korean vessels, crude oil transportation routes and citizens.
For the first time, he specifically raised the possibility of strengthening the Cheonghae Unit's role, saying it is already deployed to respond to threats to Korean nationals and shipping routes, including piracy, and that the government is “reviewing and deliberating on strengthening” its role.
"If the purpose is to protect commercial vessels without directly engaging Iran, expanding the Cheonghae Unit’s operational area to waters near Hormuz is possible," said Shin Jong-woo, secretary-general of the Korea Defense and Security Forum.
But that distinction could become blurred if Korea goes beyond protecting its own vessels, according to Shin.
“For instance, gathering or sharing intelligence for U.S. operations could take on the character of supporting military operations against Iran,” he said.
Shin Beom-chul, a senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute, said that another option would be to contribute military assets such as maritime patrol aircraft or a logistics support vessel through a separate multinational maritime security framework rather than U.S.-led military operations.
“If military assets are committed to a separate maritime security coalition that Britain and France may form, it could be differentiated from U.S. military operations,” he said. “It would be better to strengthen Korea’s contribution to the strait in that direction and persuade the U.S.”
Lawmakers from four minor progressive parties hold signs opposing the deployment of Korean troops to the Strait of Hormuz at the National Assembly in Seoul, Thursday. Yonhap
Any expansion of the Cheonghae Unit’s mission, however, could face another hurdle at home over whether the government needs fresh consent from the National Assembly.
“The circumstances are very different from 2020 because there is now an ongoing war,” said Shin Yul, a political science professor at Myongji University.
He pointed to Seoul’s decision to expand the unit’s operational area to waters around the Strait of Hormuz in 2020 without seeking separate parliamentary approval, while keeping it under independent Korean command and outside the U.S.-led International Maritime Security Construct.
At the time, tensions had surged after the U.S. killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani in a drone strike and Iran retaliated with missile attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq, but the confrontation stopped short of a sustained war between the two countries.
“Even if the Cheonghae Unit does not engage in combat, expanding its mission toward the Strait of Hormuz without Assembly consent could fuel criticism that the government is pursuing a roundabout deployment,” he said.
Vice Defense Minister Lee Doo-hee told lawmakers earlier this month that any decision to deploy forces would require “public consensus and National Assembly consent in accordance with domestic legal procedures,” while stressing that no decision had been made.
Against this backdrop, opposition has already emerged from progressive political and civic groups.
The Jinbo Party has warned against what it calls a “roundabout deployment,” arguing that an expanded Cheonghae Unit’s mission could still amount to involvement in the war despite Lee’s pledge.
It also remains unclear whether such a limited role would meet Washington’s expectations.
Foreign Minister Cho Hyun told U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington. D.C., Friday (local time) that Seoul was willing to make a “substantive contribution” to restoring freedom of navigation through the strait and would continue close consultations with Washington.
The foreign ministry’s official readout did not specify what that contribution would entail.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a researcher at a private security think tank questioned whether such a limited contribution would be enough for Trump.
“Such a mission would be appreciated and desirable under normal circumstances, but the situation in the Strait of Hormuz remains dynamic and unpredictable,” he said. “I doubt whether Trump would be satisfied with that.”