A desperate measure

By David Nicoll

The closure of the Gaesong Industrial Park (GIC) on Feb. 10 is, from one perspective, perhaps an understandable decision motivated by a need to act following recent provocations by North Korea, but in a broader context it can also be said to be a somewhat rash and desperate measure.

The litmus test for all South Korean administrations is to respond to provocations by the North in a coherent and strategic way while maintaining long-term objectives. Under such pressure, the decision-makers can give in to a powerful temptation, “to be seen to be doing something,” in order to maintain the perception that they are making the right decisions. Correspondingly, citizens expect dynamic leadership and media pundits issue emotive accusations if no action is taken. However, decisions taken in the interests of perception rather than furthering long-term policies are highly unlikely to be the best ones and ultimately, as with the closure of the GIC, will create further problems.

Inevitably, if the long-term objective remains to engage Pyongyang in order for it to abandon its nuclear program and move toward reconciliation, this additional disengagement will further diminish chances of dialogue. The GIC is always referred to by the Yonhap News Agency and other local media as “the last remaining symbol of inter-Korean reconciliation.” Now that symbol is erased, or at least temporarily cast aside, chances of talks with the North are further reduced. Moreover, the act was justified in a scrappy and contradictory manner. Unification Minister Hong Yong-pyo said on Feb. 14 that the decision to shutter the GIC was taken based on evidence that 70 percent of money from the industrial park was funneled by the North into funding its weapons program. Hong retracted this the following day saying there was no such evidence. The gravity of this mismanagement should not be forgotten in future decision-making regarding the North. It’s a prime example of a desperate measure taken in order to be seen to be doing something at the expense of long-term policy objectives. As painful as it must be for the current administration to admit incompetence on such an important issue, it should be regarded as a lesson for all future decisions regarding the North made under pressure. It is fair comment to say that Hong and the government failed the litmus test and as a consequence, an essential support column in the policy structure for engagement with the North, collapsed.

David Nicoll, a former journalist, now works as copyeditor at The Korea Times.