pyongyang Tong Kim (1) - What Do Koreas Expect From Summit?

By Tong Kim

Korea Times Columnist

The news of a second summit meeting between the North and the South scheduled toward the end of this month has triggered a flood of comments pouring in from apprehensive conservatives and boosted liberals.

A quick poll shows that a great majority of the people welcome the meeting, although they are not as excited, nor do they have as great expectations as they were and did at the time of the first inter-Korean summit in 2000.

Even the hard line conservatives cannot afford to take a political position opposing the meeting itself.

Yet the timing, venue and political context in which the meeting will take place have instantly become controversial. Why now with only a little over five months left of President Roh Moo-hyun's term and only four months before the December presidential election?

Why in Pyongyang again whereas North Korean leader Kim Jong Il had promised to pay a return visit to South Korea? And what do Kim and Roh wish to accomplish?

The U.S. State Department issued a short statement welcoming the meeting as a ``surprising development.'' It was Kim Jong-il that surprised everybody again: It was his decision to accept Seoul's proposal for the meeting under his terms, including the timing and the venue.

Talk of a North-South summit had long been around town since early this year.

But many observers doubted whether Kim would be interested in meeting with the lame duck president of the South.

There are ample indications that the United States wanted the pace of inter-Korean relations to be a step behind the progress of the denuclearization talks. Also Kim's primary interest has always been improved relations with the United States as he believed once U.S.-DPRK relations are normalized, it would be easier to seek continuing political and economic cooperation.

Few people believe what the government says is the true agenda for the second summit, that is to ``open a new phase in the quest for peace on the Korean peninsula, common prosperity and unification.'' But the people believe the summit meeting will at least contribute to tension reduction and economic cooperation, toward confidence building and to the creation of a peace regime.

Any agreement on an inter-Korean peace system will be simply a repetition of the unfulfilled 1991 basic agreement between the North and the South, which included a non-aggression agreement. For a peace mechanism to be able to replace the armistice agreement, it should include the United States and China as well, who are the signatories of the truce arrangement.

In this context, President George Bush's Hanoi comment last November seems to have been overblown in Seoul, as if the United States would sign a peace agreement before or without the final dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons and programs.

There is no question in the minds of all parties concerned _ South Korea, and the United States and surrounding countries _ resolution of the nuclear issue remains the paramount requirement for peace on the Korean Peninsula and the region.

The question is, will Roh get an unequivocal commitment from his North Korean interlocutor that the North will completely, verifiably and permanently give up all its nuclear weapons and programs?

If this is done, it will not only dispel the lingering doubts that the North has not made a ``strategic decision'' to give up its nuclear weapons and is still playing a protracted nuclear game to extract economic and political benefits, while hoping it can keep at least the weapons it has already developed. Kim's clarification will help make progress at the six party talks. Roh's meeting with him should not undermine the role of the multilateral nuclear forum.

It will be interesting to watch what Kim will say in this context, as the North has long refused to discuss the nuclear matter with the South, saying that it is an issue to resolve with the United States. The two leaders can make a joint statement of agreement that the North will carry out its international obligations to give up its nuclear weapons.

Of course there will be some sort of agreement that the South will provide an economic incentive to the North. But Roh should carefully consider domestic sentiment against just giving aid without something in return. The North Korean leader no doubt wants an increased infusion of economic aid from the South to improve his moribund economy.

Probably the unspoken political motivations of both leaders are to influence the South Korean presidential election in favor of a candidate of pro-government groups, who actively support the engagement policy. Intended or not, in reality a positive result from the summit will at least have a measured impact on the coming election. For this reason, the opposition party is reacting to this ominous development.

Kim may also have agreed to the summit to enhance his position in relation to the United States by showing South Korean support as an example of doing business ``between us as the same nation,'' a phrase that does not fit in the contemporary age of globalism and worries many internationalists.

One thing about North Korea, nothing important gets done without Kim's decision. The summit is an important opportunity to talk to him directly.