ed Road to co-destruction

Joint industrial park has stopped operation. What’s next?

If Gaeseong Industrial Complex closes its door for good, North Korea will lose a cash cow generating about $80 million annually, while South Korea’s overall financial loss will be at least 10 times as much.

These are not small sums, but Pyongyang will be able to live without it. Nevertheless, the North will suffer far greater damage on its reputation than on its finance, and not temporarily but lastingly. As President Park Geun-hye pointed out, which countries or companies will invest in a country that throws away business contracts like trash?

For South Korea’s $1-trillion economy, the lump-sum loss of $800 million may be negligible even if the government has to make up for the losses of firms involved. From Seoul’s standpoint, the loss will be more symbolic than substantive, but the symbol has enormous significance.

In a nutshell, the possible closure of the joint industrial park will remain as the painful failure of the crucial experiment: reunified Korea.

Such a fiasco, coming on top of the suspended tourism project to Mt. Geumgang, will push any reconciliation between the estranged Koreas another five years away or even longer even if the ongoing military escalation ends up in actual conflicts, limited or full-scale. This is why we agree with the Park administration’s taking Pyongyang responsible for the inter-Korean tension and hostility but disagree with its solution.

Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae flatly rejected opposition lawmakers’ proposal for sending an envoy to the North, expressing doubts about the timing and efficacy of such an act. Presidential Spokesman Yoon Chang-jung also said Cheong Wa Dae is intently analyzing Pyongyang’s intention. These officials might be heeding conservatives’ calls for restraint, saying such a concession would appear as capitulation and spoil the recalcitrant regime further.

The hard-liners’ advice may be good if only the South’s ultimate goal is just to wait it out by controlling the situation ― until Seoul faces the same situation all over like a never-ending déjà vu. But for how long should this vicious cycle be allowed to continue? If the experiences of the past few decades are any guide, North Korea is more likely to explode than implode, taking South Korea, along with it. Seoul’s eventual goal cannot be riding out one crisis after another but finding a fundamental remedy through more active and creative diplomacy.

Pyongyang reportedly is about to launch another mid-range missile to the Pacific, as early as today, ratcheting up regional tension yet to another high. Military watchers do not rule out the possibility the North’s fourth nuclear test would follow it soon. It’s one thing to call on the unpredictable regime to stop any further provocations and restore normal operation of the industrial complex, but it’s another to move Pyongyang in that direction.

Believe it or not, North Korea has long said it would abandon nuclear weapons once the United States turns the armistice into peace treaty. The time has long past the U.S. gives it a try. And Seoul persuades Washington to do so, if under the surface. The upcoming visit by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is such an opportunity.