ed New command structure

Perfect defense posture must be prioritized

South Korea and the United States reaffirmed their strong determination to deter any North Korean aggression or military provocation during their annual Security Consultative Meeting in Washington Wednesday.

The allies agreed to identify specific types of nuclear threats by North Korea and map out joint deterrence strategies tailored to each type of threat by 2014. Specifically, Washington committed itself to providing and strengthening extended deterrence for Seoul, using its full range of military capabilities, including the “U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike and missile defense capabilities.’’

As a follow-up to the bilateral agreement last month on its missile development program, South Korea will set up a “kill chain’’ to detect, target and destroy North Korean ballistic missiles by 2015. Under the agreement, South Korea was allowed to nearly triple its ballistic missile range up to 800 kilometers.

The two countries also reaffirmed their plan to transfer Washington’s wartime operation control (OPCON) over South Korean troops to Seoul by December 2015 as scheduled on condition that the transition should sustain and enhance their combined defense posture and capabilities. As a result, the Combined Forces Command (CFC) will be dismantled under the transition plan.

Drawing our attention, in this regard, is that the allies decided to form a joint working group to study the possibility of drafting a new model for an alternative joint operations body. South Korea’s Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin told reporters after the meeting, the last of its kind under the incumbent Lee Myung-bak administration, “There have been discussions about how to utilize expertise accumulated under the CFC structure after the OPCON transition. South Korean forces will play a leading role and their American counterparts will play a supporting role. The issue is how to form a decision-making body within the structure of Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff.’’

The idea of creating the joint operations unit after the dissolution of the CFC came to light in August. At the time, we sympathized in principle with the need to study an alternative system, given lingering doubts that the allies will be able to carry out combined operations as effectively as before.

There are pros and cons on the virtual “mini-CFC.’’ Conservatives support its creation, saying the absence of a control tower will wreak havoc in combined operations in the event of contingencies.

Given that South Korea is still lacking in intelligence gathering and precision strike capabilities and that tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain unchanged even now that Kim Jong-un has taken power, anxieties about the OPCON transfer are plausible. The U.S., for its part, has no reason to oppose the creation of the mini-CFC, considering China’s strong emergence in Northeast Asia.

But liberals claim that the South Korean military needs to stand on its own feet, shying away from its heavy dependence on U.S. forces in defending the country. What’s most important is for our top military brass to set up a perfect defense posture so that there is no security vacuum here after 2016.