Powerful and prosperous?

Atomic bombs, missiles won’t solve North’s problems

North Korea is well on its way to becoming a ``powerful and prosperous” country by 2012.

This is a natural ― rather inevitable ― conclusion from the two latest media reports: First, the North has been digging special tunnels at a site in North Hamgyeong Province to prepare for another nuclear test. Second, it also completed building a sophisticated missile launch facility near its border with China late last year to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Pyongyang must be thinking it would be able to unveil a nuclear bomb-tipped ICBM on the 100th birthday of its founder, Kim Il-sung, in April, or the National Foundation Day in October, realizing its long-held dream of becoming a ``powerful” country. It would then attempt major negotiations with South Korea and the United States and wrest political and economic concessions to also turn itself into a ``prosperous” country.

There are too many questions splintering the North Korean leadership’s daydreams, however. Would Washington and Seoul, long and well aware of the North’s true intentions, allow one more nuclear test or missile launch to take place? If the North has its way in conducting additional tests, would its capitalist rivals pay in humanitarian aid as the price for peace? Even if Pyongyang succeeds in exchanging weapons for money, would North Koreans ― let alone foreigners ― think the last Stalinist holdout in the world is powerful and prosperous?

Signs are clear that the U.S. won’t overlook a third missile test-fire. Last month, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates warned that North Korea’s ICBM program was becoming a ``direct threat” to the United States … possibly within five years. On Wednesday, U.S. National Intelligence Director James Clapper echoed, ``Although both Taepodong-2 launches ended in failure, the 2009 flight demonstrated a more complete performance than the July 2006 launch."

Washington has known for years about the construction of a more modern missile launch pad, most likely since it started in 2002 or 2003. The fact that the two top U.S. officials are raising this issue now is less because the facility has been completed or America has suddenly reawakened to the seriousness of the issue but more because the U.S. administration wants to link it to its Missile Defense program and ensure Seoul’s more active involvement. It would mean the start of a shift from ``strategic patience” to ``strategic involvement” ― instead of ``strategic engagement” as the North Korean leadership may be hoping.

Pyongyang should be well aware of the consequence of its moves on the peace and stability in this part of the world by now. Especially now that it saw how the sinking of South Korean frigate Cheonan and shelling on Yeonpyeong Island brought regional tension to a boiling point by forcing the confrontation of the G2. The same could be said about China, if it had helped or even merely looked over the construction of the missile launch site along its border.

As always, it is the North Korean people who have to bear the brunt of this escalating confrontation. Many North Koreans, for whom mere survival is their only concern, might feel all this chatter about powerful and prosperous country is deception. Its leadership might even know it’s nothing but self-deception to prolong the status quo through third-generational power transfer.

It’s too early to tell whether Kim Jong-il’s plan to cede the power to his son would succeed or not. If the senior Kim is to secure the dimmest chance for it, what he should hand over to his successor are not bombs and missiles but a bold pledge to reform and pursue openness under a new leader.

It would be all the better if South Korea could provide sufficient incentives for such a shift through a more realistic Korea policy instead of just waiting for the North to change or collapse, like it is doing now.