Additional US sanctions

Preemption, not reaction, can lead to denuclearization

In short, the additional U.S. sanctions on North Korea aim at blocking cash flows to Pyongyang by pressuring its enablers.

The advantages and disadvantages of the so-called country-specific _ or custom-made _ punishment also couldn’t be clearer by the nature of its form as an administrative decree.

Washington, for one, will be able to take punitive actions _ freezing assets and properties owned by foreign banks and businesses that help North Korea in its illicit activities _ in far faster and more flexible ways than in the case of enacting a law. As the legal ground of the decree is limited to the U.S. territory, on the other hand, it depends on the voluntary cooperation of foreign governments to take substantive effect.

This brings one back to square one: China, which has the largest number of banks and firms dealing in business transactions with North Korea. Yet Beijing has stood by Pyongyang more closely than ever in handling the sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonan, even seeming ready to expand the basically inter-Korean conflict to a G2 confrontation.

Washington was right to try to separate North Korea’s general public mired in dire economic difficulties from its leadership enjoying an extravagant lifestyle. Only, it is hard to tell government businesses from private ones in a zero-sum communist society like North Korea.

President Obama’s point man on disciplining Pyongyang, Robert Einhorn, seemed to be well aware of these limitations when he insinuated that the ``pressuring should not just be for the sake of pressuring,” leaving open the door for the North to come back to the dialogue table. But the U.S. official also made it clear Washington is no longer interested in the ``dialogue for the sake of dialogue,” as if to remind all watchers that the U.S. has not forgotten its ultimate aim _ North Korea’s denuclearization.

Despite the plethora of rhetoric from major parties involved _ Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang _ few political analysts harbor much optimism about the prospects of their resuming peace process in the near future. The Lee Myunb-bak administration has gone too far to retreat in inter-Korean confrontation, while the U.S. and North Korea can ill afford to turn to appeasement _ or show weakness _ because of their political timetables of the mid-term elections and another father-to-son power transfer, respectively.

Expectations were high among the supporters of inter-Korean reconciliation here when a liberal U.S. president took office almost 20 months ago. But the North Korean issue seems to have fallen far lower in Obama’s priority list, which was somewhat inevitable given the enormous workloads on his two hands _ namely the two wars and near-collapsed economy. North Korea itself was of little help, either, by virtually rejecting a handshake.

Yet the Obama administration is to take part of the responsibility for adhering to his predecessor’s failed stick-and-carrot policy by only reacting to Pyongyang’s actions.

The last thing Washington seems to want in this part of the world is China’s growing dominance. The only thing the U.S. can do to prevent this is to take North Korea into its sphere of influence with a far bolder approach.