Operation Plan 5029

Don't Let Contingency Scenario Become Self-Fulfilling Prophesy

``Leak" is media jargon referring to sources passing classified information to reporters they choose, with certain intentions. It is mainly used when officials want to test public reaction to their decisions or actions before making them public.

The latest case in point might be Yonhap News Agency's Sunday story on the completion of the ``Operation Plan (or OPLAN) 5029," the ROK-U.S. military action plan in case of emergency situations in North Korea under six different scenarios ― outflow of weapons of mass destruction, regime change, civil war by a coup, South Koreans held hostage in large number, mass exodus of North Koreans and natural disasters.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff officially denied the report, which quoted high-ranking informed sources without identifying them, but, by most appearances, this could be the proverbial case of "no smoke without fire."

It is of course more than necessary for the allies to prepare for any unexpected situations within the unpredictable regime that occupies the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. Yet, the leakage case raises at least two questions: Is it appropriate for the two allies to think of military options first in dealing with emergency situations in the North and is it proper to make such plans public at a time when the three countries are about to enter into dialogues?

It's common sense that the military option should be the last resort under any circumstance. Either North Korea would be able to get over the emergency on its own or its counterparts can help it through dialogue and cooperation. Seoul, for instance, is urged to provide food aid to prevent massive famine in North Korea instead of letting the tragic situation happen first and belatedly trying to cope with it.

The joint military action in the North ― which could be interpreted as unjustifiable invasion into a sovereign country by international laws ― could also raise serious regional trouble, triggering intervention by China, a most dreaded case, even though it may not be the exact repletion of the situation here almost a half century ago.

Even in terms of the bilateral relationship, it could pose the serious problem of Washington's infringement on Seoul's sovereignty, which explains why the previous Roh Moo-hyun administration rejected the U.S. proposal in 2005 to turn the hitherto ``Conceptual Plan (CONPLAN) 5029" into an operational plan. It was, in short, just another case of the Lee Myung-bak administration's ``ABR (anything-but-Roh)" about-faces in administration and diplomacy.

One example of the sovereignty controversy could be about the provision, which, as Walter Sharp, commander of U.S. Combined Forces Command, said, leaves the removal of WMD and massive landing operation to U.S. troops even after the wartime operational command is transferred to South Korea by 2012, which shows the command takeover will be far from complete.

It is left to anyone's guess whether this news will work to scare the North to come to the dialogue table earlier than expected or give even more excuses to Pyongyang to put forth anti-Seoul and anti-Washington tirades regarding the latter's hostility toward the isolationist regime.

One thing seems certain, though: You hardly feel like talking when others say you must talk, because you are doomed to collapse soon anyway.