Room for Maneuver

Seoul Ought to Have Big, Concrete Diplomatic Vision

No Korea-U.S. summit can be insignificant, considering Washington's influence not just on the Korean Peninsula but on all of Northeast Asia.

Especially so will be Tuesday's meeting between Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama, in part because it takes place as the region enters into ``the third North Korean nuclear crisis'' and because it will determine the diplomatic keynote between the two allies through the remainder of their leaders' coinciding tenures.

Looking back, the liberal-conservative governmental combination between the two countries has gone astray over the past decade and a half except for the brief, yearlong conservative match-up of former U.S. President George W. Bush and President Lee. So it's rather ironic that North Korea's miscalculated nuclear and missile challenges have served to dissolve the potential difference between the new, liberal U.S. administration and the conservative Korean government.

It seems only natural in this regard that the words most frequently heard in both capitals are ``perfect cooperation'' and ``airtight alliance,'' particularly at a time when their common adversary is rattling its nuclear saber in more threatening ways than ever.

Just as among individuals, however, a country needs to have its own subjective criteria in deciding policies and courses of action to maintain an equitable relationship with its friends. And this should be based on a broad, long-term perspective on its national interests. We doubt in this vein whether the Lee administration has such a diplomatic philosophy and blueprint.

The Obama administration, which has wanted to put North Korea on the back burner in order to put out a far more urgent fire in the Middle East and South Asia, may feel it rather annoying to be forced to deal with Pyongyang's undue and untimely provocation, in part facilitated by the unnecessarily confrontational stances of Seoul and Tokyo.

A case in point is President Lee's reported proposal for the five-party talks that excludes North Korea ― which most experts say would prove to be impractical due to opposition from China and Russia ― while only driving North Korea to turn even more hostile toward the South. Equally adverse will be the calls from some conservatives here for a wider ``U.S. nuclear umbrella'' while postponing the restoration of wartime military command from the United States. The former would give Pyongyang even firmer pretexts for nuclear armament and the latter would extend the U.S. military responsibility in this part of the world, which Washington could find quite cumbersome.

In the worst-case scenario, Seoul's undue reliance on Washington will lead to its isolation from the most important talks that could determine the fate of this divided peninsula. Diplomatic experts say the trilateral talks between Washington, Beijing and Tokyo scheduled for next month could be such a harbinger.

Maintaining tight cooperation with allies is important, but that should not necessarily mean the voluntary reduction of one's own room for maneuver. A good example was President Lee's remarks that the North's nuclear weapons are for the power transfer within the Kim family, or that the Seoul government can't do anything about the withdrawal of South Korean firms from an inter-Korean industrial park.

We hope President Lee's U.S. visit will not end up an occasion to deepen Seoul's already serious dependency on Washington.