Future of Denuclearization

Six Countries Should Keep Momentum of Talks Alive

Two words could characterize the six-year process involving six countries to dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons programs: distrust and ambiguity.

It was affirmed yet again last week, as all participants left Beijing empty-handed with little hopes for a breakthrough anytime soon. Just as the reason for the breakup of the latest round of talks was ambiguity over the verification regime, the vagueness on whether to continue energy and other aid to the North makes it uncertain when ― or whether ― the next meeting could take place.

And behind all this is mutual distrust among the participants, particularly between Pyongyang and Washington. The biggest blame for the ongoing deadlock should belong with the isolationist North, which refuses to allow the gathering of soil and air samples. Pyongyang says this amounts to exposing its nuclear capability amid a lack of sufficient trust, adding it is an issue of sovereign authority and national security.

The North's distrust of Washington is not entirely unfounded, but the reclusive regime needs to be in another's shoes. For it is the very capacity that other countries seek to confirm through the verification. As long as Pyongyang tries to hide its whole picture, the trust quintessential for the continuity of this process cannot grow.

North Korean leaders may want to withhold the concession on advanced verification protocol to give it to the next U.S. administration of President Barack Obama as an ``inaugural present." That may be tactically right, but strategically wrong.

Most of the free world wants the denuclearization of North Korea not for the diplomatic legacy of a specific U.S. administration but for peace and security of this globe. What's important is not just the North's denuclearization itself but also in what process it is made.

It is not certain whether Obama would immediately launch a direct and tough diplomacy with Pyongyang as he vowed to. Even if he does, however, that does not mean Washington would finance all the economic rewards the North wants, particularly at a time when America is reeling under its worst recession in decades.

Russia and China are most active now in pushing ahead with heavy oil supply to North Korea despite the nuclear stalemate, but there is no guarantee the two biggest allies of Pyongyang will continue to do so if their protege goes farther from them for a new patron.

As things stand now, all participants in the multilateral talks appear to be losers: Washington is frustrated, Pyongyang is criticized by all, Beijing feels powerless and Seoul is seeing its leverage reduced to almost nothing. Moscow appears to be a spectator while Tokyo has all but been a spoiler.

Each player should try to do its part to restore the multilateral process because it is the best solution the world can hope to get. South Korea may be the biggest loser even in the lose-lose meeting. Following the example of Tokyo, Seoul took the lead this time in linking economic aids to verification regime, playing a decisive role in its breakup. The Lee Myung-bak administration, like its counterpart in Tokyo, is now caught in a ``trap of conservatives," who rather want to see the situations aggravate with little concerns about its consequences.

Most worrisome is that the Lee administration is doing this with no firm principles of its own, instead seeking hard-line partners, first in the failed outgoing U.S. administration and now in the equally precarious Japanese cabinet. Next time, it may be Seoul's turn.