Trump’s gesture, Pyongyang’s calculations
Ma Young-sam
As a ceasefire memorandum of understanding to end the Iran war came within reach, U.S. President Donald Trump posted a striking photograph on his social media channel. It showed Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un walking side by side during their 2018 Singapore summit. There was no caption, yet the message seemed clear: After Iran, North Korea may be Trump’s next diplomatic agenda.
Trump has reasons to revive the North Korean issue. With U.S. midterm elections only four months away, the political outlook for Republicans is uncertain. The prolonged war with Iran has pushed up oil prices, fueled inflation and weakened public support for Trump. If he seeks a dramatic event to shift public attention, few options rival another summit with Kim. Trump has also long sought to portray himself as a peacemaker. Few issues fit that image better than North Korea’s nuclear program. The Nobel Peace Prize may remain an unfulfilled ambition.
Trump has repeatedly signaled his willingness to meet Kim again. He did so during last year’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Korea and again around his recent visit to Beijing. He may even have asked Chinese President Xi to help restart U.S.-North Korea dialogue. According to President Lee Jae Myung, Trump also expressed strong interest in the North Korean nuclear issue during their talks at the recent G7 Summit in France.
Yet Pyongyang has remained silent.
To understand why, one must examine how North Korea’s strategic environment has changed since the failure of the Hanoi Summit in 2019. Above all, the Russia-Ukraine war transformed North Korea’s relationship with Moscow. Pyongyang has supplied troops and military equipment. In return, Russia has expanded assistance to modernize North Korea’s missiles, submarines and other strategic capabilities. Russia’s economic support has also grown. North Korea’s economy reportedly expanded by 3.7 percent last year — its strongest performance in eight years.
China appears to be adjusting its approach as well. During Xi’s recent visit to Pyongyang, discussions reportedly focused more on economic cooperation than denuclearization. With Russia and China providing political, military and economic backing, North Korea has far less incentive to seek sanctions relief through negotiations with Washington.
If Pyongyang returns to the negotiating table, its objectives may differ from the past. Rather than discussing denuclearization, it may seek arms-control talks after securing de facto recognition as a nuclear-armed power. This raises an important question: After observing the U.S.-Iran negotiations, has Kim begun to rethink his strategy toward Washington?
There are surprising parallels between the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement and the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The Singapore statement affirmed North Korea’s commitment to work toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Yet at the Hanoi Summit a year later, Washington and Pyongyang discovered that they held fundamentally different interpretations of denuclearization. The summit ended without agreement.
The JCPOA met a similar fate. In its preamble, Iran reaffirmed that it would never seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Trump withdrew from the accord in 2018, arguing that it could not reliably prevent Iran from eventually obtaining such weapons.
However, big changes were observed in Trump’s approach during the recent U.S.-Iran ceasefire negotiations. The U.S. president demonstrated sufficient flexibility. Under Paragraph 8 of the memorandum of understanding, Iran reiterates that it will never produce nuclear weapons, while most substantive nuclear issues are deferred to follow-on negotiations over the next sixty days. Trump has often denounced Obama’s JCPOA as one of the worst agreements ever negotiated. The question now is whether his administration can produce a more rigorous, verifiable and durable framework than the one he discarded.
The challenge is that today’s circumstances are less favorable to the U.S. than in 2015. Iran’s nuclear capabilities have advanced significantly. It now possesses about 441 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, a stockpile that did not exist when the JCPOA was signed. There is still no agreement on how this material should be handled, nor will it be easy to persuade Iran to suspend what it considers its sovereign right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.
North Korea is surely watching closely.
If Washington ultimately makes major concessions to Tehran, how will Pyongyang interpret the outcome? It may conclude that skillful negotiations allow a country to preserve core strategic assets while extracting meaningful concessions from the U.S.
For Seoul, this possibility raises serious concerns. South Korea hopes U.S.-North Korea dialogue can reduce tensions and advance peace on the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, Seoul prepare for the possibility that Washington and Pyongyang could reach an agreement that does not adequately reflect its security concerns.
The U.S.-Iran negotiations already offer an important lesson. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have long maintained close ties. Yet many observers argue that Israel’s strategic concerns were not fully reflected in the final phase of negotiations with Iran. That is especially noteworthy given the influence of the Israel lobby in American politics.
What if a similar situation emerges on the Korean Peninsula?
Imagine North Korea responding to Trump’s overture and returning to negotiations. Pyongyang may propose a partial dismantlement of nuclear facilities, a suspension of uranium enrichment, and a freeze on intercontinental ballistic missile development in exchange for the withdrawal of U.S. forces stationed in Korea. From Trump’s perspective, such a proposal could appear attractive. It would reduce direct threats to the U.S. homeland while lowering the cost of maintaining forces overseas. Of course, this remains hypothetical. Yet diplomacy and security require preparation not only for favorable outcomes, but also for adverse ones.
The Korea-U.S. alliance is the most reliable pillar of our security. Also dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang is essential for lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. But before the two leaders meet again, we Koreans must carefully assess the calculations driving both sides. Our future and security cannot be left to decisions made by others. Pyongyang remains silent today. But the real question is not why North Korea is silent. It is what kind of bargain may already be taking shape behind that silence.
Ma Young-sam is research fellow at Asiatic Research Institute of Korea University. He is former ambassador to Israel and representative to Palestine.