South Korea faces choice: Russia or Europe
Lee Sang-soo
North Korea is not the only country profiting from the war in Ukraine. In some respects, South Korea has also benefited. North Korea has supplied Russia with military goods and equipment potentially worth billions of dollars, while South Korea’s arms exports to Europe rebounded to roughly $11 billion in 2025. Despite this parallel, the two Koreas differ sharply in their diplomatic stances. Pyongyang’s ties with Moscow have deepened through the war. By contrast, Seoul’s position has not changed dramatically: It continues to keep one foot in Europe while maintaining an eye on Russia.
That difference matters. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, South Korea has made significant commercial gains as a defense industrial partner in Europe. Poland remains the clearest example, but it is not the only European country to forge a strong defense partnership with South Korea. Romania, Norway and Finland point to something broader than a series of one-off deals. South Korea is no longer seen merely as a rapid supplier filling wartime shortages. It is increasingly viewed as a potential long-term industrial and strategic partner, as European countries are under pressure to rebuild their defense capabilities, expand maintenance and production networks, and place greater emphasis on resilience and interoperability. The war in Ukraine — along with growing uncertainty about U.S. commitments to its allies — has accelerated military buildups across Europe.
For Europe, the question is no longer simply whether South Korean weapons can be delivered on time. It is whether South Korea can be trusted as a long-term partner.
President Lee Jae Myung has characterized his foreign policy as "pragmatic." He frames diplomacy less in ideological terms and more in the language of national interest, economic gain and flexibility in an increasingly unstable world. As part of this approach, Seoul has sought to expand arms exports to Europe while striving to keep channels open with Russia.
This strategy, however, rests in part on the hope that once the war in Ukraine ends, relations with Moscow — particularly in trade — can be restored. This expectation is understandable. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, bilateral trade reached approximately $27.3 billion in 2021, making Russia South Korea’s 10th largest trading partner. Some policymakers may believe that a ceasefire, if clinched, could allow for a partial reopening of trade. They may also hope that, as the war subsides, Russia’s reliance on North Korea will diminish, enabling Moscow to return to a more balanced posture on the Korean Peninsula and perhaps even play a constructive role in inter-Korean dialogue aligned with Lee’s North Korea policy.
Yet this amounts to little more than wishful thinking. Europe’s expectations of South Korea are evident in NATO’s Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL). Seoul has hesitated to join PURL, citing concerns about possible Russian retaliation. Officials have stated that South Korea is consulting with NATO on various forms of support while maintaining its policy of not supplying lethal military aid directly to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Australia, New Zealand and Japan — none of them NATO members — have demonstrated clearer support by joining PURL. From a European perspective, this contrast is difficult to ignore.
The deeper issue is that Seoul’s hesitation appears rooted in an outdated view of Russia. In the 1990s and 2000s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow improved relations with Seoul while downgrading ties with Pyongyang as it sought integration into the emerging international order. This shift made a more balanced approach to the Korean Peninsula possible.
That Russia no longer exists. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has severed ties with the West and consolidated authoritarian rule at home. It now views North Korea not as a liability but as a valuable ally. The 2024 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty illustrates this shift, emphasizing continuity, institutionalization and long-term alignment. More broadly, it reflects a transformation in Russia’s approach to the Korean Peninsula. The earlier emphasis on denuclearization and diplomatic resolution has given way to deterrence. Pyongyang is no longer treated primarily as a nuclear problem to be managed; it now serves a clear function for Moscow by providing military utility, geopolitical leverage and a reliable anti-Western partner. This view is unlikely to fade even if a ceasefire is reached between Russia and Ukraine.
If Seoul’s pragmatic foreign policy is based on the assumption that prewar levels of cooperation with Russia can be restored, it requires a fundamental reassessment. South Korea is unlikely to be able to sustain close ties with both Russia and Europe. Increasingly, it faces pressure to choose between them.
Europe may remain willing to purchase South Korean weapons. However, long-term defense cooperation depends on more than cost and performance. It requires mutual confidence, trust and alignment in responding to shared security risks. If Seoul seeks a deeper relationship with Europe — one comprising not only arms sales but enduring defense cooperation and trust — it will need to demonstrate greater clarity in its position.
Europe wants more than South Korean weapons. It wants to know whether South Korea is prepared to stand with it as a genuine partner. If Seoul cannot answer that question more clearly, its pragmatism may ultimately prove neither strategic nor practical.
Lee Sang-soo is the founder of Strategic Linkages based in Stockholm, and an external consultant to the European Parliament. He previously worked at the Institute for Security and Development Policy. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent those of The Korea Times.