Lee Jong-eun is a Assistant Professor of Political Science at North Greenville University.
4 years of Russia-Ukraine war: Old and new geopolitical lessons
Lee Jong-eun
By Lee Jong-eun
This week marks the fourth anniversary of the beginning of the Russia–Ukraine war. On Feb. 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a “special military operation” against Ukraine. Four years later, the “military operation” continues as the largest conventional war in Europe since World War II.
Even now, the war’s end remains uncertain. The latest trilateral talks in Geneva among the United States, Russia, and Ukraine ended without success, once again failing to reach consensus on key settlement issues such as territorial sovereignty and the postwar security framework. In Russia and Ukraine — and worldwide — widespread war fatigue is accompanied by anxiety over the war’s eventual outcome.
The war has reaffirmed a number of familiar geopolitical lessons. It has also introduced new lessons for policymakers facing contemporary geopolitical challenges. Although “learn from history” is a cliche that is often unfulfilled or misapplied, commemorating past and present military conflicts should challenge us to better understand the origins, prevention and termination of these conflicts.
The first geopolitical lesson is that confidence in a quick victory is often a motivating factor in the outbreak of war. Nazi Germany’s confidence in a quick victory motivated its invasion of the Soviet Union, until winter arrived. North Korea’s confidence in a quick victory motivated its invasion of South Korea. Russia, too, was motivated by confidence in rapid success when it launched military operations against Ukraine. By contrast, concerns about a drawn-out conflict may have restrained the Trump administration, limiting the scope of U.S. military operations in Iran and Venezuela and preventing attempts at full-scale regime change.
Although military buildup carries its own risk of escalating geopolitical tensions, increasing an adversary’s reservations about a prolonged, costly war remains a valid lesson on mitigating the risk of military conflict. For this reason, multiple countries pursue a “porcupine strategy” to deter neighboring adversaries. Ukraine’s continued ability to project a fortified military and political defense will be integral to reducing the risk of future conflict with Russia.
The second geopolitical lesson is that once a military conflict has begun, the incentive to achieve compensation becomes prevalent. Paradoxically, as the costs of conflict rise, a country may become more reluctant to suspend fighting without a tangible achievement that can at least partially justify or compensate for those costs. A series of U.S. presidents prolonged U.S. military interventions in Vietnam and Afghanistan to avoid an outcome of complete defeat. Russia, too, has rejected peace settlements that would not allow it to expand territorial control over Ukraine’s Donbas region.
As the motive for compensation can incentivize a country to endure a prolonged war, the best time to prevent military conflict is before it “actually starts.” If a conflict is already underway, negotiators face the difficult task of balancing the need to offer some form of face-saving outcome while discouraging hopes of further gains through prolonged fighting.
The third geopolitical lesson is that wars cause shifts in allies and adversaries. Wars can create new strategic incentives for expanding or fragmenting existing alliances. During World War II, Finland temporarily aligned with Nazi Germany against the USSR, while the USSR later allied with the United Kingdom and the United States. During the Russia–Ukraine war, Russia has faced strain in its relationships with Central Asian partners and shifting degrees of support from China. At the same time, Russia has received more robust support than expected from North Korea. Ukraine, in turn, has faced challenges in responding to policy shifts among Western countries, including the United States.
Despite attempts to consolidate commitments, alliances will inevitably fluctuate as allies’ strategic priorities diverge. These challenges necessitate realistic and flexible expectations of allied partners, particularly during military conflicts. For Ukraine, and for countries that rely on alliance-based security strategies, flexibility in “burden sharing” will be crucial to long-term alliance management. On the other hand, geopolitical fluctuations open the prospects for a country to explore a strategic partnership with a non-ally whose strategic interests overlap, even if only temporarily.
These past geopolitical lessons have proven their enduring relevance in the Russia–Ukraine War. The war, however, may have also revealed a new lesson for contemporary geopolitical conflicts. Conventional warfare may be becoming durable, even with attrition. While civil wars or fights with insurgency groups have been common, there were hopes, particularly during the post–Cold War period, that the increased destructive capacity and controversies of interstate conflicts would dissuade states from a prolonged war.
The Russia–Ukraine War, however, may be showing that states have also improved in managing conventional war costs. The use of armed drones can mitigate battlefield casualties. Improved technological assistance can mitigate civilian suffering from air strikes on energy infrastructure. Even after four years, Ukraine and Russia’s capability to continue a large-scale war may embolden states weighing the prospect of future military conflicts.
Some may be relieved that the Russia-Ukraine War did not escalate into a war on a global scale. Some may also find solace in the fact that the war has demonstrated Ukraine’s national resilience and has reawakened Europe’s aspirations for military rearmament. Yet the failure to do more than contain the ongoing war has had adverse effects on increasingly fragmented, tumultuous global affairs. As diplomatic efforts continue in the Russia-Ukraine war, it offers lessons in vigilance in efforts to prevent similar geopolitical conflicts from arising in Europe, Asia and elsewhere.
Lee Jong-eun (Jong.Lee@ngu.edu) is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University. Prior to this, he served as a South Korean Airforce intelligence officer.