Seoul must update view of shifting US policy world
Soo Kim
For many Koreans, the United States still lives in memory as a coherent giant — a country with a long-term, unified strategy, fixed institutions and continuity in foreign policy. This framework was created in the 1990s and early 2000s, when Washington’s decision-makers generally spoke with one voice, and alliance commitments were anchored in shared values and a common vision rather than political whims.
Fast forward to 2025. The U.S. policy world seems more splintered, and perhaps even more pluralistic. While U.S. power has not vanished, what’s changed are the pathways through which it flows — increasingly distributed across institutions, shaped by various interests and incentives and articulated through a more diverse range of actors.
One strategic challenge Seoul faces in the alliance might be its view of Washington as unified, predictable and internally cohesive. This mindset, while not entirely flawed, does not entirely capture the reality of U.S. decision-making today. And such misunderstanding comes at a cost.
For decades, Korea viewed U.S. power through a relatively stable lens, and rightfully so. From Seoul’s perch, Washington appeared to be a cohesive, well-oiled national security establishment, with two main political parties that, despite diverging views, ultimately converged on foreign policy direction for the common national good — a foreign policy cohort with deep institutional memory and a strategic culture that placed a premium on long-term interests over short-term domestic gain.
Korea built many of its alliance assumptions on this foundation. And for better or worse, Seoul could expect a degree of predictability and continuity across administrations — regardless of the political party — and operate under the assumption that senior U.S. officials spoke for Washington’s broader decision-making system. In short, there was a rhythm that Seoul could rely on.
But the U.S today is motivated by a different, shifting set of internal forces, and critically, Seoul risks misreading its ally when it relies on an outdated framework.
Decision-making in the U.S. — and arguably in many parts of the world — is no longer unified. Influence and authority are segmented and channeled through a multitude of institutions, including the private sector and other constituencies that shape political incentives. Naturally, these entities do not always converge on interests.
So what does this mean for allies? For one, Washington’s messaging is more layered and nuanced. A statement from one institution may not reflect the overall position of the U.S. government. By extension, fragmentation leads to inconsistencies in positions.
Second, visibility has become a political currency. Heightened domestic polarization has led officials to speak first to their constituencies to address their demands. At times, public statements by officials may be aimed more towards shaping narratives at home than communicating foreign policy positions to allies. Thus, what sounds like a shift in posture may actually be a temporary intervention in a domestic political debate.
Korea sometimes attributes policy weight to prominent, high-profile voices. But in a complex decision-making environment like the U.S., influence is more often exercised behind the scenes by lower-profile, less public actors as the more visible players cater to domestic audiences.
Third, variability is built into the system. The U.S., much like Korea and other democratic states, turns over a significant portion of its foreign policy decision-making workforce every few years. New faces, learning curves, legislative gridlocks, donor priorities, public messaging and media dynamics all influence the policy timeline. Commitments may be strongly articulated with the most earnest intent, yet short-lived in reality. Not to mention, policy priorities can shift not just between administrations but within them.
In a state where multiple engines of power operate simultaneously, this is not entirely a surprise. Washington’s capability remains extraordinary, but for allies and partners, the new framework requires greater awareness and agility in the face of decision flows that are becoming less and less linear.
When Seoul assumes that Washington operates under the same model and coherence of 20 years past, several challenges emerge.
First, Korea may overinterpret Washington’s signals as coordinated, reflective of the entire U.S. decision-making system or more intentional than they actually are. Not every comment by an official is policy; not every exclusion is deliberate or strategic.
Second, the personal networks developed in a more predictable, linear era may not serve Seoul’s interests, or those of the alliance. Familiar channels may no longer grant Korea the access it needs; the old system does not represent the realities of decision-making and authority today.
Finally, it’s important to realize and prepare for variance in U.S. commitments across political cycles. Timing, domestic constraints, economic conditions and internal party dynamics can all either constrain or place greater weight on foreign policy.
If the U.S. policymaking framework has been updated, then Seoul’s strategic understanding of Washington should follow suit. Rather than seeing the U.S. as a single, unified entity, Korea may want to view its ally as a system with multiple evolving and shifting centers of power. Effective and pragmatic engagement requires touchpoints beyond the executive branch, acknowledging the nodes of authority that contribute to Washington’s decision-making. Seoul may also consider planning with fluidity and agility to reflect the realities of policy and strategy today.
More fundamentally, a stronger interpretive capacity — including a more nuanced grasp of Washington’s internal debates, constraints and political tides — could help Seoul navigate the new decision-making environment, not only in Washington but in other parts of the world as well.
For better or worse, the U.S. decision-making and authority landscape has changed. This does not subtract from the importance of the U.S.-Korea alliance; if anything, it underscores the need for an even tighter bond. However, given the challenges and new contours of U.S decision-making today, Seoul must approach the alliance with a clearer view of the system it is navigating.
Soo Kim is a former CIA analyst and strategic risk consultant.