Korea-US alliance at a critical juncture

Park Jung-won

By Park Jung-won

• Published Oct 1, 2025 10:00 AM KST

Something has gone seriously wrong in the Korea-U.S. relationship. Back in late July, the Korean government proudly declared that the long and difficult tariff negotiations with Washington had finally concluded successfully. The next month, following the Korea-U.S. summit, a presidential spokesperson told reporters there was no need for any written agreement because the meeting had gone “so well.” Everything, we were assured, was firmly under control. The public was told to relax.

Yet only weeks later, President Lee Jae Myung himself said in an interview with Time magazine that U.S. demands were excessive and unfair. He even warned that accepting them could trigger a financial crisis — and even lead to his impeachment.

So what happened between then and now? Was the summit such a triumph that it required no written statement, as the spokesperson claimed? Or was the administration eager to trumpet a success story back then, only to rewrite the script when it became politically convenient? Do they really believe the Korean people can be deceived this easily?

This episode revealed more than a simple policy dispute. It showed how the administration uses the alliance: as a prop when it needs praise, and as a target when it needs a villain. And through it all, it assumes the public will accept these contradictions without question.

The Georgia incident made things worse. In August, hundreds of Korean workers at a factory in Georgia were suddenly detained in a sweeping U.S. immigration raid. The images shocked Koreans across the nation. Many asked why the U.S. authorities acted so abruptly, without prior consultation with Seoul. Anger at Washington was natural. Yet the administration’s reaction was revealing. Instead of approaching the problem as a diplomatic crisis to be solved calmly, it flirted with anti-American rhetoric. It highlighted U.S. responsibility while saying little about Korea’s own failures of preparation. It treated public anger as a political asset rather than a problem demanding a solution.

Foreign policy should not be conducted this way. A responsible government calms emotions at home while negotiating firmly abroad. It does not feed populist anger for domestic advantage. It does not risk long-term alliances for short-term applause. And it certainly does not use a single diplomatic mishap to reopen old ideological battles for political gain.

Then came the remark about U.S. troops in Korea being “foreign troops.” This was no casual slip. It revealed something fundamental about how the administration views the alliance itself. For decades, the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula has served as the ultimate deterrent against North Korean aggression. It has been the foundation of extended deterrence — the assurance that any attack on South Korea would bring an immediate U.S. response, using the nuclear umbrella if necessary.

To call these forces “foreign troops” trivializes the entire nature of the alliance. It suggests that Seoul sees the U.S. presence not as a joint security commitment but as an external imposition. That message is heard not only in Washington but also in Pyongyang and Beijing. It invites doubts. It emboldens adversaries. And it undermines the strategic stability that has kept the peninsula from sliding into open conflict for decades.

The nuclear freeze comment deepened these concerns. North Korea has repeatedly declared it will never give up its nuclear weapons. Its leader Kim Jong-un has said this repeatedly: Nuclear arms are non-negotiable, denuclearization is off the table, and the world should stop dreaming about it. Yet Lee suggested in an interview with foreign media that freezing North Korea’s current arsenal might be a realistic first step. Did he realize what message this sends? A freeze means allowing the North to keep what it already has. It risks signaling that Seoul is prepared to accept Pyongyang as a de facto nuclear power. It blurs Korea’s strategic position and sows confusion among allies.

Security policy requires discipline. Words must be chosen carefully. Strategies must be coordinated with partners. A single sentence from a head of state can move markets, shift alliances, even change the calculations of adversaries. Why speak so casually on such a critical issue? Why give away negotiating leverage in a media interview rather than at the bargaining table?

And what about the impeachment comment? The ruling party today controls an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly. It has even faced criticism for trying to oust the Supreme Court’s chief justice, threatening the basic framework of checks and balances. Yet the president claimed that accepting U.S. demands could lead to his impeachment — a scenario that is absurd on its face. There is no political reality in which this legislature — dominated by his own party — would remove him from office. So why say it?

Was this an attempt to portray himself as a victim under siege while holding near-absolute power at home? Was it a way to shift blame onto Washington for domestic economic troubles? Whatever the motive, the contradiction is glaring. Domestically, this administration has been aggressive, domineering even, using its parliamentary majority to bulldoze opponents and impose institutional reforms. But when speaking to foreign audiences, it suddenly casts itself as cornered and powerless. The inconsistency is staggering. And it leaves allies wondering whether Seoul’s words can still be trusted when policies shift so abruptly.

The pattern is now unmistakable. Silence during the negotiations. Loud self-congratulation after the summit. Anti-U.S. rhetoric when political winds shift. The message changes with the moment, as though national security and the alliance itself were mere tools of domestic politics. One cannot help but wonder: Can this man ever change?

The coming months will be critical for Korea’s future. Of course, the Trump White House — with its chaos and impulsiveness — has hardly been a model of steadiness or restraint. But if relations with Washington spiral into catastrophe, it will not be the U.S. that pays the highest price. It will be Korea. What Korea needs now is not posturing or empty rhetoric, but a leader who knows this is about the nation’s survival— not his five years in power.

Park Jung-won (park_jungwon@hotmail.com), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics (LSE), is a professor of international law at Dankook University. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not reflect the editorial direction of The Korea Times.