To CMA, or not to CMA, that is not the question
On Sept. 19 2018, North Korean Defense Minister No Kwang Chol and South Korean Defense Minister Song Young-moo signed an Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation, known as the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” or more commonly known as the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA). The purpose of the CMA was to decrease military tension between both North and South Korea along the line of contact and a possible future arms control. The agreement called for the removal of landmines, guard posts, weapons, and disarming the personnel in the Joint Security Area (JSA) from both sides of the North-South Korean border. The agreement also called for the creation of joint military buffer zones.
The DPRK agreed to dismantle its nuclear complex in the presence of the international community if the U.S. takes correlative action. The DPRK also agreed to complete its dismantling of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, which started in July 2018, and that the dismantling of Sohae’s missile engine test site and launch pad would be observed by the international community as well. Kim Jong-un also pledged to visit Seoul “in the near future.”
Critics of the CMA did not trust the North Koreans and were especially concerned that the CMA would significantly cripple the South Korean military’s ability to provide warnings of North Korean provocations and thus weaken readiness. Supporters accepted the fact that it would limit both North and South surveillance capabilities, but because South Korea has more advanced capabilities, whatever was lost would be easily compensated.
Whether one trusts North Korea or not, a stable DMZ and Northern Limit Line (NLL) was an imperative for a “peace process” to proceed. It is very unfortunate that the hoped-for peace regime was not achieved but supporters still point to the fact that there were no significant armed clashes along the DMZ and the NLL in this time period. This is probably because North Korea felt it was in their best interests to keep this area stable and not because of the CMA itself.
With the failure of the peace process, North Korean missile advances, drone incursions and a few minor infractions along the DMZ and NLL, and especially the war in Ukraine and the recent surprise attack on Israel by Hamas, the Yoon government has called for a cessation of the CMA. Although this is a matter of policy and political view, there are a few concerns to this action.
First, the justification and support is not shared by the Korean public as well as the international community. North Korean actions have been disappointing, to say the least, but the threshold of totally renouncing the CMA should be a violent action by North Korea.
Secondly, tensions are already high on the Korean Peninsula. Throwing out the CMA might actually make South Korea look like the perpetrator of a future military provocation. International support is critical and controlling the narrative is hard as it is. South Korea should be very careful not to lose the moral high ground.
Finally, the CMA is not the root cause of the military problem that South Korea must solve: it is readiness. The “peace” mood created by the CMA caused most mediocre commanders to neglect training. COVID-19 gave a great excuse to not train as well. Instead of trying to find every possible way to train, in spite of COVID-19, most units focused on preventing infection. In other words, units quarantined rather than trained.
The final straw was a sudden focus on “human rights” in the military. The Korean military had a long tradition of strict discipline that was based on a society that also had its roots in authority of the family and school. Under a progressive government, these traditional social values changed for the better but this caused social clashes that impacted the military. The military was not prepared to confront soldiers who started asking questions and second-guessing their superiors. Korean commanders are not accustomed to explaining to a person, who doesn’t want to be in uniform in the first place, why he has to stand guard duty in the cold.
A peacetime army struggles to remind itself why it must train. Nobody can dispute safety but the fact is the military handles weapons that are designed to explode and are big. Civilians complain about noise and accidents but it is a matter of either inconvenience or national survival. As of now, we will pay a dear price if we do not fix this problem immediately and no one should think that nullifying the CMA is going to solve these problems.
The issue of renouncing the CMA can be dealt with later. The real issue is training and equipping the Army and gaining public support.
Chun In-bum (truechun@naver.com) served as a lieutenant general of the ROK Army and commander of Special Forces Korea.