Russian invasion of Ukraine and Korea's response
By Sean O'Malley
South Korea should take heed of the situation in Ukraine. Russia's recognition of two breakaway republics and the sending of Russian troops into the sovereign territory of a free and democratic Ukraine is a gross violation of long-established international law.
In response to this despicable violation of national sovereignty, Western democracies have promised moral support for Ukrainians and increased sanctions on Russia. The willingness to provide meaningful military support is tentative at best.
The crisis in Ukraine is a stark reminder that there is no help like self-help in the international system. When it signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in 1994, Ukraine willingly abandoned its nuclear weapons arsenal.
Russia has now found it convenient to disregard the agreement and go back on its word. Would this be the case if Ukraine still had a nuclear deterrent? One can surely bet that North Korea is internalizing this blatant back-stabbing by a great power, and South Korea should as well.
The crisis also reminds us, to paraphrase Henry Kissinger, that states have no permanent friends or enemies, only interests. Ukraine is a major transit country for Russian energy to Western Europe. This has made it difficult for Western European states to choose a policy response. Doing what is right ― upholding international law and protecting a free and democratic Ukraine with military support ― would put Europe's expedient energy policies at risk.
Germany, a middle-power champion of democracy and human rights, is effectively paralyzed by its economic ties to the authoritarian Russian regime ― in South Korea the Moon government calls such policy paralysis “strategic ambiguity.” Yet, the Moon administration has joined other global middle powers in following U.S.-led sanctions on Russia.
Unfortunately for Ukraine, capabilities-based military might reigns supreme in the anarchic state system. It is how less powerful states gain respect from greater powers. All power and leverage wielded by the North Korean regime vis-a-vis great powers is due to its weapons of mass destruction. Without these programs, North Korea would be relegated to an afterthought on the global stage. Its weapons programs keep the country relevant.
When the next South Korean administration begins in May, it will face a number of structural and strategic challenges. North Korea's weapons of mass destruction; Chinese and Russian incursions in the Korean air defense identification zone; Chinese and Russian joint naval drills in the region; illegal Chinese fishing in South Korean waters; over-reliance on the Chinese market for trade; and a looming demographic crisis are some of the most serious problems in need of reasoned solutions.
In a few short decades, the aging and shrinking population of South Korea may be unable to muster the manpower necessary to defend itself against unlawful incursions. South Korea is a democratic middle power reliant on the United States for security and China for trade, with three nuclear-armed, incursion-happy, authoritarian states as neighbors. So, what should the country do?
As it stands now, many North Korea watchers believe the right combination of political and economic incentives will lead to the denuclearization of North Korea. Kim Jong-un ultimately desires a better life for his people is the refrain, despite all evidence to the contrary. No political force in history has led to more death and suffering of the Korean people than the Kim dynasty of North Korea and their Chinese backers. From the total war they unleashed in 1950 to the massive and systematic human rights abuses of the past eight decades, the Kim dynasty has been a continuing terror for Koreans.
Therefore, the first thing the next administration should consider is a recalibration of relations with North Korea, the fulcrum around which all other South Korean regional relations revolve. Immediately, the new administration should come to terms with a stark reality: North Korea will never willingly denuclearize. Acceptance of this reality annihilates the premise of progressive engagement policies from South Korea ― the cynical belief that South Korean money in the form of inter-Korean economic cooperation can buy compliance from the Kim dynasty.
It also effectively ends the delusional and declarative policy of complete, verifiable, irreversible, denuclearization (CVID) pushed by the United States. Although an open admission of this acceptance may be anathema to U.S. policymakers, it would open possibilities for more creative engagement with the Kim regime and allow for a more objective assessment of the second suggestion.
South Korea should immediately begin a crash program of nuclear weapons development for deterrent purposes. The benefits are four-fold: The country would gain a defensive deterrent; gain some strategic respect from its more powerful nuclear neighbors; be able to negotiate as equals with the North Korean regime; and end its reliance on the United States nuclear umbrella. Recent surveys show a majority of South Koreans believe a home grown nuclear deterrent is necessary.
Lastly, any engagement or inter-Korean economic aid from South Korea to North Korea should be predicated on the introduction and improvement of civil, political, and social human rights for the North Korean people. This provides a values-laden and principled foreign policy of solidarity with the North Korean people aligned with the intentions of the South Korean Constitution. The South can begin by securing reunions for families separated by the Korean War. This is a simple request that has gone unanswered by the Kim regime for far too long.
If middle-power South Korea wishes to have leverage and respect when dealing with other powers in its region, then it must present a strong and disciplined foreign policy backed with the capabilities to support its intentions. Many may say this analysis is faulty, as South Korea is an alliance partner of the United States unlike Ukraine, which is neither a member of NATO nor the European Union. To this I offer a simple retort: There is no help like self-help in the international state system. Just ask the Ukrainians.
Sean O'Malley (seanmo@dongseo.ac.kr) is a tenured professor of international studies at Dongseo University, where he teaches classes on U.S.-Korea relations and regional integration. He has published numerous papers on security and regional issues important to South Korea.
The views expressed in the above article are the author’s own and do not reflect the editorial direction of The Korea Times.