Contending formulas of denuclearization
Contending formulas of denuclearization
By Tong Kim
Since Kim Jong-un mentioned “a phased approach with synchronized measures towards denuclearization” in a surprise meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on March 26, much discussion has focused on the potential consequences of a Trump-Kim meeting.
U.S. President Donald Trump appears to be looking forward to meeting the North Korean leader, although Kim is yet to respond to Trump's acceptance of his invitation. Kim's motive for a sudden shift from confrontation to dialogue may be because of the effectiveness of sanctions and military threats against the North, but it may also be because of his confidence in negotiating leverage from Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal.
The replacement of H.R. McMaster with John Bolton as U.S. national security adviser raised legitimate concerns, but it was not to change Trump's position on North Korea. McMaster and Bolton both advocated a preventive war, while Mike Pompeo, the nominee for secretary of state, did not. Pompeo, as CIA director, has touted removing Kim Jong-un from the North Korean nuclear programs.
Even if Bolton starts his new job, despite a controversial conflict of interest reported in the press, all the bellicose statements he made in the past should not matter as much as advice he will give Trump. Bolton made this point clear shortly after Trump's announcement of his appointment. Trump does not listen to his advisers. He wants to be unpredictable as the ultimate negotiator with the North.
Trump's primary interest is to denuclearize North Korea once and for all in the shortest time. North Korea is not coming to the table to surrender or to unilaterally disarm its nuclear and missile programs. The Libyan style of “denuclearization first and rewards later” will not work because of the North's lesson from it.
Both sides are aware of what the other side wants. Yet they should listen to each other's intent and views on the very topic of denuclearization. The North Koreans have proven themselves tough negotiators who favor a package deal that can be implemented by a principle of simultaneity: “word for word, and action for action.”
In a top-down format of negotiation, Trump and Kim could agree on the goal and direction of denuclearization, defining the meaning of denuclearization and its scope of application, and hopefully on a general road map toward the end state of negotiation. The details on implementation can be left to the lower tiers to work out.
If both leaders have political will, they can even agree on a target date for completing the process of denuclearization or disarmament. Trump may wish to pull off a positive outcome from his meeting with Kim and take it to the next presidential election or even to November elections. Kim may have a similar incentive for his domestic consumption, if he is assured of the security of his country.
However, given the magnitude and complexity of the North's nuclear/missile programs, implementation and verification of any agreement may have to go through a set of gradual phases. The process could be two phases, through freeze and dismantlement or three phases, through freeze, dismantlement and the final disposal of the North's nuclear arsenal.
In view of the North's diplomatic initiatives, the inter-Korean summit on April 27 is expected to produce a positive result that can set the tone for Trump's meeting. In this regard, the South should establish its role as a legitimate party to the denuclearization talks, not simply as a mediator between the North and the U.S.
Seoul should be able to discuss the denuclearization issue bilaterally with Pyongyang and participate in future multilateral negotiations that may include a trilateral summit with Washington and Pyongyang, or the six parties _ China, the U.S., Russia, Japan and the two Koreas. There were reports that Kim Jong-un told Xi Jinping of his interest in returning to the six-party talks.
The format of a comprehensive package deal was used in the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Sept. 19, 2005, statement of the six-party talks. The problem with both agreements was in implementation. North Korea is accused of failing to carrying out its obligations. However, there is plenty of evidence that the U.S. was also responsible for the failures of two landmark agreements on North Korea.
We have gone along a similar path before. We should avoid those things that went wrong in the past. As Ronald Reagan said, we will have to “trust but verify” again. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is not impossible. We can still do it for the benefit of peace and prosperity for all.
Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies.