Keep it simple, Mr. Moon

By John Burton

• Published Jan 22, 2018 5:30 PM KST
• Updated Jan 22, 2018 5:30 PM KST

It’s no secret that there is considerable skepticism in Washington, D.C., about the durability of the inter-Korean detente that has led to North Korea agreeing to participate in the PyeongChang Winter Olympics. Most U.S. analysts believe that even if the Olympic Games go ahead without a hitch, further progress will flounder in the spring as the U.S. and South Korea resume joint military exercises and North Korea conducts more missile tests.

The challenge for President Moon Jae-in is to keep the spirit of reconciliation alive in the face of daunting odds and that means managing expectations. He cannot be seen as being “played” by Pyongyang into undermining international sanctions against the North. He also needs to dampen down talk that the current process will somehow lead to North Korea’s denuclearization. He needs to focus on incremental confidence-building steps instead of tackling big issues at the beginning.

Seoul has already made one tactical mistake in raising the denuclearization issue early in the talks with Pyongyang. That was a gesture that appeared aimed more at assuring the Trump administration that Seoul was onboard with U.S. goals rather than facilitating progress with the North, which has firmly rejected any talk of abandoning its nuclear weapons.

Seoul can also be faulted for raising “unification” themes too soon by pushing for the joint entry of the two Korean teams under a common flag at the opening Olympics ceremony and fielding a unified team when it comes to women’s ice hockey. This has raised the ire of South Korean conservatives who may try to derail efforts to reduce inter-Korean tensions.

As it is, Moon is already facing a conservative backlash with claims that he is conceding too much by allowing North Korea propaganda artistic groups to make an appearance. That could trigger protests by conservative groups at Winter Olympic events, promoting North Korea to withdraw from the games. Pyongyang is already complaining about criticism in conservative newspapers about its attendance.

Moon will have to preserve and build on any progress made during the Olympics. That includes keeping open the inter-Korean hotline whose service was restored in early January after a two-year shutdown by North Korea. Next steps should include family reunions, broadening communications channels, restoring regular military meetings at Panmunjom, and people-to-people exchanges in humanitarian, educational and cultural areas. Most of these activities existed during the “sunshine” era of Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, but were canceled or scaled down by North Korea to protest the conservative policies of Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye.

Restoring inter-Korean trust will be difficult. For example, Seoul has already raised the possibility of family reunions, but Pyongyang has suggested that it will not agree to them until the return of the “kidnapped” North Korean restaurant staff who worked in China before fleeing to South Korea.

Kim Jong-un might also seek Seoul’s help in reviving the North Korean economy. But Seoul realizes that it cannot do much in this regard without appearing to undermine the international sanctions regime against Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs. As a result, South Korea may be limited to participating in humanitarian programs.

The uphill task that Moon faces is complicated by the fact that the U.S. is intent on pursuing its campaign of “maximum pressure” against North Korea. A group of Western countries meeting in Vancouver last week said they would consider tougher sanctions against Pyongyang, while U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warned that North Korea could trigger a military response if it did not choose negotiations. That stance appeared to undercut the group’s statement of support for renewed inter-Korean dialogue “in hopes that it leads to sustained easing of tensions.”

The fact is that Moon will have to pursue a policy of engagement under the shadow of North Korea unwillingness to give up its nuclear weapons program. That will likely condemn any hopes in Seoul of achieving some sort of interim agreement toward a phased approach to denuclearization, particularly given the volatile nature of Pyongyang’s diplomacy.

If Moon moves too aggressively in mending inter-Korean ties, he also faces the possible threat of the U.S. taking a tougher stance in the ongoing KORUS FTA negotiations, although that carries the risks of the U.S. further alienating Seoul.

On the other hand, if Moon is viewed as a “team player” by Washington, the Trump administration might decide to make only slight changes to KORUS, with a likely focus on the auto sector, which accounts for most of the U.S. trade deficit in goods with Korea.

Caught in the crossfire between the U.S. and North Korea, Moon has little room to maneuver. He may have to satisfy himself with only small and simple steps to keep things on an even keel.

John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is now a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.