Compounding of N. Korea issue
By Tong Kim
.jpg?w=728)
In the wake of Trump’s Asia trip and following a two-month pause of North Korea’s kinetic provocations, the Korean peninsula appears to have been relieved from the risk of an imminent military conflict, although high tensions continue. A clear path to the resolution of the nuclear/missile issue is still missing.
Trump’s trip was focused on the North Korean nuclear threat, U.S. trade imbalances, and on a new, broader U.S. Asia policy ― for trade and security interests ― for the Indo-Pacific region. Throughout his trip, Trump did well, by sticking to the scripts, away from his usual bombastic rhetoric on twitter or off the teleprompter.
Trump’s position remains unchanged: apply maximum pressure and sanctions of worldwide unity against Kim Jong Un until he gives up his nuclear weapons, which few believe will happen. Military options remain on the table, which increasingly become more unrealistic and less credible for implementation.
In Seoul, Trump warned North Korea “not to underestimate or try us,” underscoring the unparalleled U.S. military might. He denounced the North Korean leadership as “the murderous regime,” calling the North “not the paradise” that Kim Jong Un’s grandfather had envisioned but “a hell.” Trump said he would still offer “a path to a much better future” for North Korea, if they would come out for “a complete, verifiable, and total denuclearization.”
In Beijing, Xi Jinping and Donald Trump agreed to work together for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. The two major powers will not accept the North as a nuclear weapons state. But Xi did not promise any new additional measures of pressure, beyond China’s commitment to fully implement UN sanction resolutions.
Some of Trump’s successes were seen in the area of trade. Japan and South Korea announced huge investments in the U.S. worth tens of billions of dollars. The two U.S. allies will spend billions of dollars to buy U.S. military platforms. And, they will renegotiate their trade relations in the context of a “fair, open and reciprocal trade” in the coming months. China offered a super business deal worth $250 billion with the United States.
For the past two months, Pyongyang, while continuing nasty rhetoric, did not launch a new nuclear or missile test. Three possible reasons: (1) they are concentrating on finding ways to survive the impact of the new sanctions that started affecting their economy; (2) they are conserving the resources for future tests of weapons; (3) they are still working on the technology to complete an operational ICBM,
However, they will continue to advance their nuclear-tipped missiles capable of striking the U.S. homeland, using whatever resources are available before the sanctions could paralyze their economy. Pyongyang shows no interest in dialogue now, maybe not until after they acquire an ICBM.
In Washington, reporting on his Asia trip, Trump said Xi and he “agreed that we would not accept a so-called ‘freeze for freeze’ agreement like those that have consistently failed in the past.” In 12 hours, Beijing’s foreign ministry denied Trump’s claim, saying that China sticks to its double freeze proposal ― freeze on the DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests in return for suspension of U.S.-ROK joint military drills, as “the most realistic, feasible, fair and reasonable plan.”
Also in Washington last week, the Senate foreign relations committee held a hearing on presidential authority to use nuclear weapons, fearing that the “unstable and impulsive” President Trump might really start a catastrophic nuclear war in Korea, given his dangerous statements such as “fire and fury the world has never seen,” or “total destruction of North Korea.”
Witnesses included the former commander of the Strategic Command that oversees the U.S. nuclear deterrent. He said if he had been ordered to fire nuclear weapons, he would first decide its legality in terms of proportionality and context, and if he determines it is illegal, he would not carry it out. In this case, the President may fire the Secretary of Defense or the combat commander.
The witnesses agreed that North Korea’s mere possession of nuclear weapons does not constitute the threat of an imminent attack, while it poses a serious threat to the U.S. and its allies. If the North attempts to use its nuclear weapons, it will justify a preemptive strike, and President Trump could order a nuclear strike. But, a preventive strike would require a Congressional approval if not a Congressional declaration of war. However, if the North keeps their weapons only for deterrent and survival, there would be no nuclear strike by the U.S. What’s your take?
Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies.