Beyond sanctions on N. Korea
By Tong Kim
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As President Trump will visit Asian capitals next month, including Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing, many analysts are busy figuring out what impact his trip may have on the prospect of a solution to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat. Upfront, I do not see the likelihood of any dramatic change in the current course of a “pressure campaign” that is spearheaded by Washington, with the strong support of its allies and partners.
There will be no big deal with China, no “Korea passing,” no agreement on a trilateral alliance that will include Japan, no clarification of military options and probably no toning down of bellicose rhetoric. There will be no announcement to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to Korea; no change to the goal of denuclearization. And, certainly, no consideration for accepting a nuclear North Korea.
There will be reconfirmation of the alliances and the U.S. security commitment to its allies in Japan and South Korea with the full spectrum of U.S. military capability. There will be a renewed pledge for close coordination on the North Korean issue. The U.S. will seek cooperation with China. Trump will welcome Seoul’s plan to enhance its deterrent through the acquisition of advanced weapons systems.
Trade issues are also high on Trump’s agenda. There will be a discussion of the renegotiation of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which actually begun after Trump threatened to terminate it unilaterally. Fair or not, Trump says every trading partner is taking advantage of the United States. What he will say to the Asian leaders with regard to U.S. trade imbalances will be an indicator of the sustainability of the neo-liberal trade order that the U.S. has established over the years since the end of World War II.
Against North Korea, Trump has made several threatening statements ― including dire warnings of “fire and fury,” “to totally destroy North Korea”, “the calm before the storm” and “only one thing will work.” While in Korea, Trump may issue a new threat, again without clarifying what that threat is. A high frequency of such bellicose rhetoric raises tensions and risks losing the efficacy of its intended intimidation, especially when such rhetoric is not supported by most Americans.
From recent developments, one can see what diplomacy means to the Trump administration in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear threat. Diplomacy is reduced to building the pressure of the international community against the regime in Pyongyang through multilateral and bilateral sanctions, including “secondary boycotts.”
In a traditional sense, the role of diplomacy is to resolve a dispute or a conflict through dialogue and negotiation. Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan said last week in Tokyo that the U.S. is “not ruling out eventual direct talks with North Korea.” I hold hopes in “eventual talks” that can help prevent any military action likely to trigger a war that will kill millions of people.
At this point, it is clear that Trump has no interest in talks. Nobody ― not White House chief of staff John Kelly or anyone of his security team ― can control Trump’s dangerous and bullying tweets. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who was told “he was wasting his time in trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man,” swallowed his humiliation, stayed on the job and complimented his boss by characterizing Trump’s tweets as “action-forcing events.”
When senior U.S. officials say they prefer a diplomatic solution, it means that they will first try to apply maximum pressure, not ruling out any eventual military option. Yet there is no guarantee that sanctions ― including the toughest version by the latest United Nations Security Council resolution ― will work this time. Nobody knows how long it will take the sanctions to effect change in the regime’s strategy.
On Oct. 18, South Korea’s unification minister, Cho Myoung-gyon, confirmed the conventional wisdom that the North will not give up its nuclear weapons. “Right now, no chance,” he said. Cho said it was Pyongyang’s claim that discussion of the North Korean nuclear weapons issue can only take place if the U.S. suspends its hostile policy towards the North.
President Moon, while supporting the maximum pressure campaign and strengthening the military deterrent against the North, does not exclude the possibility of dialogue. He has no other choices, as the North is moving fast toward the completion of its nuclear force.
Trump and his counterparts in Asia should focus on finding a peaceful resolution to the North Korean issue, beyond sanctions. What’s your take?
Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies.