Day of reckoning

By John Burton

• Published Mar 22, 2017 4:54 PM KST
• Updated Mar 22, 2017 4:54 PM KST

Analysts are debating the meaning of U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s remarks on North Korea during his trip to Northeast Asia last week. Were his comments that the “policy of strategic patience has ended” and that the U.S. was “exploring a new range of diplomatic, security and economic measures” just a blunter restatement of the Obama policy or did it signaled a new hardline approach?

The fact that Tillerson’s statements are provoking such contrasting reactions indicates that reading the Trump administration’sintentions may prove to be as difficult to determine asthose of Pyongyang. But to me, Tillerson’s stance in ruling out further negotiations with North Korea represents a firm step toward confrontation.

It is particularly noteworthy that Tillerson’s position that talks with Pyongyang have “failed”is being stated at a time when there is a rising bipartisan chorus among many North Korea specialists in Washington that negotiations represent a last chance to at least “freeze” Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile program before it achieves a full-scale breakout that would likely led to the world’s next major war. The Chinese government has made a similar assessment as it urges renewed talks, while South Korea, if it elects a progressive as its next president, is likely to join the bandwagon.

The Trump administration’s antagonistic attitude toward China -- and likely South Korea under its next president -- makes a negotiated settlement more difficult. Tillerson has made clear that China should press North Korea to abandon its nuclear and missile program, but there is little incentive for Beijing to do so when it faces the prospect of increased trade protectionism in the U.S.

This reveals the perils of the Trump administration’s “America First” policy that emphasizes the protection of U.S. jobs and the reduction or elimination of bilateral trade deficits, particularly with China, Japan and South Korea.

U.S relations with Asia appear to be judged in the White House primarily on economic criteria, while not taking into account the security ramifications. This makes it increasingly difficult to find a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem through multilateral diplomacy.

Adding to the uncertainty is that the Trump’s foreign policy team lacks experience in Asian affairs. Most of its senior members have a strong background instead in the Middle East, reflecting the president’s obsession with “radical Islam.” The administration is also becoming increasingly distracted by the looming scandal surrounding contacts between Trump campaign aides and Russia last year.

The portrayal of the North Korean nuclear issue on U.S. cable news networks does not help since Trump appears to depend on this source for most of his information. Kim Jong Un is viewed as “crazy” dictator who would take the first opportunity to nuke Los Angeles once he gets a workable ICBM missile.

This simplistic scenario leaves out any discussion that North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is a response to perceived risks to its survival that could be addressed by the offer of a U.S. security guarantee, for example.

The fact of the matter is that the Trump administration is offering “all sticks and no carrots” to Pyongyang, while putting less emphasis on a more nuanced strategy of coordination with China, Japan and South Korea to solve the nuclear issue.

The U.S. has only three options in dealing with North Korea. One is a pre-emptive military attack by the U.S. on North Korea that could quickly escalate to a regional nuclear war that would devastate Northeast Asia.

The second is tougher economic sanctions that would mainly be implemented by China combined with increased military deterrentmeasures, including the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system.

But outsourcing the solution to China is impractical.Beijing would avoid imposing sanctions punishing enough to cause the collapse of North Korea, which could trigger a massive refugee wave across its border and provide an opportunity for U.S. and South Korean troops to occupy the country. In addition, China is unlikely to cooperate in face of the THAAD deployment, which it views as a strategic threat.

That leaves negotiations as the third option. Such a deal could include Pyongyang suspending its nuclear and missile tests in return for the U.S. and South Korea doing the same for their joint military exercises.

But in now refusing to consider negotiations, the Trump administration is almost guaranteeing that North Korea will continue to develop its nuclear deterrent and force the U.S. to respond with a military attack sooner or later.

Chinese President Xi Jinping could still try to persuade Trump to adopt a more conciliatory approach when they meet, possibly in April, although the chances that Trump will agree look slight.

In the meantime, China is likely to exploit a more provocative U.S. stance on trade issues with South Korea and even Japan to undermine their ties with Washington as Beijing prepares its own defenses against a possible U.S. military intervention against North Korea.

John Burton, a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is now a Washington,. D.C.-based journalist and consultant. He can be reached at johnburtonft@yahoo.com.