Recommendations on N. Korea
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By Tong Kim
It is an undisputed assessment that North Korea has an offensive capability to strike all parts of South Korea and Japan with short and midrange missiles. It keeps advancing its nuclear and missile technology faster than expected, posing a threat directly to the United States. What should be done about it?
First, let’s not rely on the same strategy ― sanctions and deterrents ― that has not worked for the past decade. The theory behind this strategy was if pressed hard enough “to the pain in the heart of the North Korean leadership,” they would come to the table.
The sanctions failed to bring the North to negotiations or to slow down its nuclear and missile programs. Yet, the sanctions have slowed down Pyongyang’s economic development. The sanctions are designed to block revenue from overseas and the import of dual use materials that could support the illegal weapons programs.
The U.N. Security Council Resolution 2270 excludes trade from punishment if it is related to the livelihood of the North Korean people. China utilizes this clause fully to keep a lifeline to the North Korean economy. Currently, the U.S. and its allies are trying to remove these loopholes by writing a new UN Security Council resolution.
There are plenty of predictions that Hillary Clinton, if elected, will toughen the sanctions to press harder on North Korea. But, it would be only doing the same thing that does not work.
China is not cooperative. Beijing is more concerned about instability on the Korean peninsula that may develop from a collapse of the regime in Pyongyang. China will not welcome a likely flood of refugees, and it fears a unified Korea allied to the United States. China needs North Korea as a buffer.
Donald Trump’s China card will not work. He said, “China should solve the problem for us. China is totally powerful as it relates to North Korea.” Trump is wrong: China does not want to solve the problem in the way preferred by the U.S. and South Korea, and China does not have that much influence on Pyongyang.
Second, let’s stop wishing for a North Korean collapse. Collapse scenarios have been around for the past two decades. A regime collapse may not lead to unification with South Korea, and unification by collapse would not be the only way to end the nuclear problem.
President Park seems more determined to seek a regime change in Pyongyang by way of collapse. Recently, she encouraged North Koreans to defect to the South “to live a new life in freedom.” The Wall Street Journal praised her “ground-breaking speech,” concluding, “The real key to ending Kim Jong-un’s rule is liberating the North’s people. Let North Koreans vote with their feet for an end to tyranny.”
The leader of a second major opposition party in Seoul characterized President Park’s call for massive defections from the North as “a declaration of war” against Pyongyang. His comment served as another moment of political division.
President Park said internal division is more threatening than the North Korean nuclear program. Ironically, she created more internal division by welcoming massive defections. Most of the 30,000 defectors who came to the South are struggling to make a living in a free society.
Kim Jong-un tightens security to stop his people from fleeing to the South. An increased number of defectors by threefold or tenfold would be unlikely to lead to an immediate collapse of the North. It would only create a bigger burden for the South to take care of.
Third, let’s exclude the option of a preemptive strike, being touted because of the inefficacy of the current policy. This option, so pervasive, was a question during the vice presidential debate between Tim Kaine and Mike Pence last Monday. Kaine said a Clinton administration would authorize it if necessary; his Republican opponent said a Trump administration would deal with the problem from “a position of strength.”
The reason for excluding the notion of a preemptive strike or a preventive strike is simple and obvious. There is no way to wage such a strike without inflicting unbearable damage to lives and properties in the South ― an instant loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and a major destruction to the nation’s capital.
No one can rule out the retaliatory capability of the North that would survive the first strike to wage a desperate counterattack. It would easily lead to an all-out war, which Kim Jong-un would not go for until he judges the end of his rule is near. We don’t even have all the targets to strike. Most of the North Korean nuclear materials and missiles are hidden underground.
During the Cuban missile crisis, John F. Kennedy rejected his generals’ recommendation to strike the Soviet missiles on Cuba, after he learned such a preemptive strike would take out 95 percent of the missiles, and the surviving missiles could strike back at the United States.
Fourth, let’s keep exploring a diplomatic solution. As the U.S. presidential election is approaching, several experts are making recommendations for the next administration on how to deal with North Korea. Most of them think dialogue and engagement ― no matter how loath to the regime in Pyongyang ― should be the path to take.
A bold decision is required to reduce tension, contain the nuclear arsenal in the North, and contribute to peace and stability. Shows of force by either side ― the U.S.-ROK by strengthening the deterrent and North Korea by conducting more missile tests ― would not contribute to a peaceful resolution. Start working on a freeze, then nonproliferation, move to moderation of joint exercises, and negotiate a peace agreement. This is the path to an eventual denuclearization. What’s your take?
Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies. He can be contacted at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.