What to do after party congress
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By Tong Kim
A couple of points of observation ought to be made from the 7th Workers Party Congress that was recently held in Pyongyang. First, the denuclearization of North Korea will not be achieved by negotiation. Second, the young and relatively inexperienced Kim Jong-un has firmly consolidated power, and his regime is not likely to collapse in a foreseeable future.
The party congress refined North Korea’s nuclear doctrine: North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons. Instead, it will “constantly grapple” with the so-called byungjin policy, aiming to improve and increase its nuclear arsenal, while rebuilding the economy.
North Korea has publicly declared and codified itself as a nuclear state in its constitution as well as in the charter of the Workers Party. The North Koreans made it clear that they will not negotiate their nuclear weapons away for anything in return.
They will keep nuclear weapons for “the dignity and power” of the DPRK that, they believe for the right or the wrong reason, will protect the survival of their regime. Kim Jong-un takes credit for developing nuclear weapons and missiles, which legitimizes the monarchial rule of the Kim family.
The third leader in succession was elevated to the new title of the chairman of the Workers Party to wield “monolithic leadership” over the party, the military, the government, and the people of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK).
At the congress, Chairman Kim declared that his country “will not use a nuclear weapon first, unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by aggressive hostile forces with nuclear weapons.”
He also said the DPRK would behave as a responsible nuclear state, taking necessary measures to assure nonproliferation and to work with other countries to build a world free of nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is to eliminate all nuclear weapons, a goal shared by President Barack Obama.
The North Korean leader also proposed inter-Korean military talks to reduce tensions. This proposal was quickly rejected by the Seoul government as part of “an insincere peace offensive.”
Some people in Seoul suspect that the North wants to seek the suspension of South Korea’s loud speaker operations along the DMZ as well as the cancellation of joint ROK-U.S. military drills.
The party congress also disclosed a daunting challenge of economic recovery, while fighting the pressure of sanctions from the international community.
Politically, the congress is seen to have “normalized” North Korea’s power structure by restoring the central ruling power of the Workers Party. Kim Jong-un’s father, Kim Jong-il’s “military first policy” was an aberration that had focused on coping with the disintegration of the old Soviet socialist camp and struggling with the economic plight by going through an “arduous march” fighting droughts, floods, and starvation.
The shifting of power from the military back to the party, by which the party will have more control of money and power, may cause a schism between the party and the military. However, given the tight networking of the ruling elites with proven loyalty by way of family relations or dedicated contributions to the DPRK system, and in view of the absolute authority of the supreme leader, it would not be a source of serious political trouble or something that might lead to a coup against the regime that will bring down the current leadership or precipitate regime change.
Now it is clear that the DPRK will not negotiate its nuclear weapons. Yet, Seoul or Washington is not talking about any new approach to deal with a de facto North Korean nuclear state.
People are still hoping that the full implementation of U.N. sanctions and additional sanctions by individual countries would compel Pyongyang to come to the negotiation table. It may take a year or two for the sanctions to work.
Sanctions have proven some efficacy but they did not succeed in paving a path to denuclearization. Whether the latest set of sanctions, known as toughest so far, would work remains to be seen.
In the mean time, North Korea policymakers ― with an exception of the Chinese ― do not seem to have a new idea about what to do regarding the latest development in North Korea.
It should not be a surprise if the Park government or the Obama administration, occupied with other priorities, does not do anything new or different during the remainder of their terms in office.
Pyongyang is already looking forward to seeing the change of administrations in Seoul and Washington. It is obvious that North Korean would prefer to see a Trump administration come into being, albeit unpredictability of its foreign policy. Pyongyang knows if Hillary Clinton be elected, her policy towards Korea would be more or less the same as Obama’s, although there are some indications that her administration would be tougher on North Korea.
Pyongyang is also looking forward to seeing a change of guard in Seoul. The next Korean presidential election ― that will be held in December 2017 ― would likely be contested in a three way race among the three major parties ― Saenuri, Democratic, and People’s ― unless the two opposition parties produce a single, unified candidate to represent all opposition forces and their supporters. A Saenuri Party candidate would have an advantage in a race against a divided opposition camp.
At a minimum, it is essential to maintain peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, until political transitions will have taken place in Washington and Seoul. The question is how are we going to contain a nuclear North Korea and seek a new way forward to deter nuclear threats from the North. What’s your take?
Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies. He can be contacted at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.