Trump on South Korea
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By Tong Kim
As Donald Trump became the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, his foreign policy statements ― including those on U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan ― that he made during his campaign are now under close scrutiny.
It remains to be seen whether his unconventional statements were simply campaign rhetoric or actually intended for action, if he is elected president of the United States in November.
Although Trump’s exaggerated statements are generally lacking in specifics of how he would carry them out, he has repeated the same provocative lines so many times and so often that anyone interested in U.S. foreign policy, including U.S. allies and foes alike, has become more serious about what the Republican nominee really means.
One thing is clear. Trump wants to pursue new American isolationism, putting American security and economic interests first. In American history, isolationism is a recurring phenomenon.
He is skeptical of U.S. benefits from alliances, by which the U.S. is committed to defend its allies. He thinks South Korea and Japan enjoy free rides, while they are wealthy and “money making machines” by selling their products to America.
He also thinks the U.S. should disengage from NATO as it was a Cold War organization that is no longer in need. He says America should stop being a world policeman.
More of interest to the Korean Peninsula is his stated reference to the termination of the U.S.-Korea alliance. He looks for “rewards” for the U.S. protection of South Korea. He thinks Korea pays only “peanuts” in the sharing of defense costs ― although Seoul pays $900 million a year, about 52 percent for the non-personnel costs of the operation of the U.S. Forces in Korea. Trump thinks South Korea should defend itself without U.S. help, if it does not reward the U.S. expense for its protection from the “maniacal” North Korea.
Trump says similar things of the constitutionally pacifist Japan. By a recent change of the relevant law, Japan is now allowed to participate in a collective security operation to assist the U.S. if in need.
To China, Trump is rhetorically harsher, calling it “an enemy” that “rips off” America by unfair trade practices, depriving Americans of jobs, and by manipulating its currency. Trump has said he would impose a 45 percent tariff on imports from the country.
He promises to negotiate a deal that would correct the trade imbalances with China, which he claims has caused U.S. national debt to reach $19 trillion and soon to reach $21 trillion if America does not take drastic action.
More shocking of all statements Trump has made on the security issue of Northeast Asia is that if South Korea and Japan are not going to “reward” the U.S. defense commitments, these two U.S. allies should arm themselves with nuclear weapons to defend themselves from the nuclear threats of North Korea.
There are a lot of problems with this proposition. Japan put aside, if South Korea develops its own nuclear arms, which some in the conservative circle insist should be the right choice for Seoul, it would first justify the North Korean nuclear program and it would lose the grounds for demanding the denuclearization of the North. It also would mean a termination of the U.S. commitment to provide the South with “the extended deterrence under the concept of the nuclear umbrella.’’
Withdrawal of the extended deterrence will expose the unprotected South to the North Korean nuclear threat. Trump’s idea would also bring an end to the NPT, which has contributed to the control of nuclear proliferation with the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
It would be a radical departure from U.S. policy that has maintained the world security order since World War II.
As a solution to the North Korean nuclear program, Trump has mentioned China’s role, as part of a deal that he would make in an effort to address the trade imbalances with China.
In short, he seems to believe that he could use U.S. economic leverage to get China more seriously involved in pressuring the North to denuclearize.
Many doubt this idea will work. China already appears more concerned about the advancing North Korean nuclear program, which endangers the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region.
China is also concerned about Trump’s China bashing, which has been a Republican practice in recent presidential campaigns. China calls for whoever becomes the next president to be reasonable in dealing with Sino-American affairs. China does not think Trump is reasonable, when he makes campaign statements about it.
Most students of Korea-U.S. relations do not believe a total withdrawal of U.S. troops, which the North has always called for, will likely happen. They recall a failed attempt for withdrawal by President Jimmy Carter, who had made a campaign pledge to bring U.S. troops home from Korea.
As a minimum, South Korea will be asked to increase its share of the operation costs of the U.S. Forces in Korea. Seoul could accommodate this request, by canceling the controversial deployment of the THAAD system, currently under consultation, and transfer the funds from THAAD to finance increased costs to the burden sharing for the alliance.
A bilateral alliance is for the mutual benefit of both countries. The U.S.-Korea alliance has served the security interests of both countries well since the Korean War ended in 1953. A reasonable investment in combined deterrence has paid off.
If South Korea has to defend itself without U.S. assistance, it is possible for the South to look to China for security assistance or it could be more interested in securing a stable Korean Peninsula through improved relations with North Korea. What’s our take?
Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies. He can be contacted at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.