No good options

• Published Jan 13, 2016 4:33 PM KST
• Updated Jan 13, 2016 4:33 PM KST

By John Burton

North Korea’s latest nuclear test has underscored the challenges in stopping Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. The North’s biggest bargaining chip is not its military arsenal, but rather the fact that it occupies prime real estate in the center of one of the most dynamic regions in the world.

It’s North Korea’s geostrategic position that makes it so difficult to deal with. Kim Jong-un, like his father and grandfather, knows that he can safely engage in reckless behavior because he can hold Northeast Asia hostage since no one wants to see the region descend into war.

Consider China, for example. North Korea’s latest nuclear test is in violation of U.N. Security Council’s resolutions that ban the country from nuclear or ballistic missile tests, a stance that has been supported by China, which was clearly angered by the new nuclear detonation.

But Beijing is coming under renewed criticism for its failure to “punish” North Korea for its nuclear ambitions. The argument is that China is the main source of North Korea’s imports of energy and food supplies and that it should do more to clamp down on trade in an effort to force Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons.

From China’s perspective, however, that is easier said than done. Beijing fears that a sudden ratcheting up of sanctions could have dire consequences for the region. It could force Pyongyang to respond by increasing tensions through provocative military actions that could spiral out of control, leading to conflict with the U.S. and South Korea and damaging the Chinese economy even if Beijing does not become involved.

Supporters of tougher sanctions hope that they will lead to the North’s collapse. But that is an outcome that Beijing wants to avoid as well. Instability in North Korea could result in thousands of refugees crossing the Chinese border. A power vacuum in the North might also trigger conflict between the U.S. and China as the two superpowers tussle over who will be dominant in China’s backyard.

As a result, China would prefer maintaining some form of the status quo, with North Korea serving as a buffer state to prevent a U.S.-backed South Korea becoming a neighbor on its border. Such a policy, though, carries acknowledged risks as well. Beijing is concerned that an increasingly powerful nuclear-armed North Korea could eventually force Japan and even South Korea to pursue its own nuclear weapons program. Calls in Seoul for the local deployment of nuclear-armed U.S. bombers and submarines no doubt are stoking Chinese concerns.

Beijing’s long-term strategy is that North Korea will eventually adopt Chinese-style market reforms to revive the country’s economy, combined with international security guarantees that would persuade Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons.

One interpretation of recent events is that Kim Jung-un may be pursuing precisely that policy. Ahead of the Korean Workers’ Party congress in May, the first since 1980, Kim needs to solidify his political control by proving he is a capable leader. A “successful” H-bomb test might be seen as helping Kim face down a military establishment whose powers he wants to curb in favor of the party.

At the same time, Kim is pursuing his policy of “byungjin,” or parallel development, of both grassroots market reforms and nuclear weapons. Kim may be gambling that his rush to miniaturize a nuclear warhead that could be placed on missiles, including submarine-based ones, will bring North Korea into the first rank of nuclear powers, even at the risk of further international sanctions and deteriorating relations with China.

If Pyongyang can achieve that goal, it would enhance its negotiating position with outside powers, including concluding a peace treaty with the U.S. that would formally end the Korean War and lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, a development that Beijing would also welcome. In return, North Korea would offer to abandon its nuclear weapons program in a deal similar to the one that the U.S. reached with Iran last year.

In the absence of robust Chinese support, the imposition of additional sanctions on North Korea will likely prove ineffective. Although the Six-Party talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue have stalled, a grand deal proposed by the forum to exchange nuclear weapons in return for economic cooperation with Pyongyang still exists.

The U.S. is partly to blame for this state of affairs. The best deal to stop North Korea’s nuclear program was the 1994 Framework Agreement under President Bill Clinton, which was essentially sabotaged by President George W. Bush when he came into office. Under President Barack Obama, the U.S. has adopted a rigid stance of refusing to negotiate with North Korea directly until it begins dismantling its nuclear program first.

If Hillary Clinton is elected as the next U.S. president, she should revive elements of his husband’s North Korean policy and engage in bilateral talks with Pyongyang to trade economic support for denuclearization, even if it means an end to a U.S. military presence in South Korea.

John Burton, a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is now a Seoul-based independent journalist and media consultant. He can be reached at johnburtonft@yahoo.com.