Searching for exit strategy
By Tong Kim
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For more than a month now, North Korea has been threatening an impending apocalyptic nuclear war. Yet, it is unlikely they would start a suicidal, full-scale war at this point, as they still have a lot to hang onto, including nuclear weapons, to resist domestic and external pressure that might affect their survivability. In addition, they have not said they would start an unprovoked attack.
For days, the world has been watching whether the North will fire an assortment of missiles, including short-range Scuds, mid-range Rodongs, and intermediate Musudan ICBMs. As late as April 12, Pyongyang said its missiles were “on standby to strike U.S. bases in the continental United States, the Pacific and other areas.”
If Washington has truly excluded the option of a preemptive strike on the North Korean missile launch sites, additional missiles or nuclear tests would have the consequence of further sanctions and increased tensions, short of setting off an automatic trip wire. If any missile inadvertently hit South Korea, Japan or Guam, it could trigger an accidental war. Otherwise, there is no prospect of deliberate war.
On the other hand, an unintended escalation of a localized conflict could quickly spiral out of control through a chain of action-reaction. There are chances of miscalculation for both sides. The North may miscalculate that it can carry out a limited attack ― conventional or asymmetric ― and achieve its intended objective. The South may miscalculate it can retaliate to a localized provocation in anticipation of no further reaction.
The U.S.-ROK allies have agreed to counter any North Korean military provocation by a plan of retaliation. If the counter provocation plan fails to deter the North, retaliation would be inevitable. However, if the plan aims to destroy “the source of provocation, its supporting forces, as well as its commanding forces,” it would be an open invitation to escalation. One way to prevent escalation would be to limit the target of retaliation to the source and the level of retaliatory force in proportion to the force of provocation.
Washington still does not believe North Korea has a tested nuclear missile capability to attack the United States, as Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed in Seoul Friday, echoing what Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said in Washington on April 11. Earlier a Defense Intelligence Agency report said the agency had “moderate confidence” in North Korea’s capability of delivering nuclear missiles to the United States.
The United States and its allies do not know exactly the real capabilities of the secretive North. Neither do they know the true intent of North Korean threats. It may include a multitude of collaborative motives: to paint Kim Jong-un as a tough leader in domestic propaganda, to extort concessions from the international community, to increase leverage in future negotiations, to be accepted as a nuclear state, or to respond to perceived threats to regime survival.
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the U.S. House intelligence committee on April 11 that Kim Jong-un’s tough statements are intended to show that his control of power is solid and to press for concessions from the international community. Whatever it may be, the North Koreans have been heard loud and are being taken seriously by Washington, Seoul, and elsewhere.
The Obama administration has stated on several occasions that the United States is fully prepared to deal with North Korean threats and to protect its allies in South Korea and Japan. To warn the North and to assure its allies of U.S. commitment to extended deterrence, the U.S. has staged a show of nuclear power under the nose of North Korea.
The show had its downside. Coupled with tough talk from the South Korean military, it also contributed to the further ratcheting up of North Korean threats. Paradoxically, the U.S. announcement on April 6 of postponing an ICBM Minuteman III test appeared to be a constructive step that was taken in the right direction.
While people were getting fed up with North Korea’s repetitive bellicose rhetoric, Pyongyang’s tentative closing of the Gaeseong industrial complex, which was regarded as a last safety valve, sounded an alarm. The closure may have been intended to convey the message that the North Koreans can make good on their threats.
Many had argued that Pyongyang would not close the lucrative complex that yields $90 million a year for the North and employs 54,000 North Korean workers. In addition, its closure would make it impossible to induce future foreign investment. At the end, the North Koreans said “dignity” is more important than money.
Last week, we finally saw a constructive move from Seoul and Washington toward an exit strategy. President Park and her unification minister made a virtual offer of dialogue to the North to reduce tensions and to discuss the reopening of the Gaeseong complex. In Washington, President Obama said he preferred to resolve the tensions through diplomacy.
In Seoul, John Kerry, in support of Park’s vision for peace through trust building in inter-Korean relations, reaffirmed the U.S. position to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea through dialogue, but only if Pyongyang fulfills its international obligations and is serious about denuclearization, a proposition that Pyongyang would not accept under the current circumstances.
It seems that Seoul is a half step ahead of Washington in seeking a peaceful resolution to the current crisis. It takes courage to walk the high road in diplomacy. Talking about talks is still better than talking about war. What’s your take?
The writer is a research professor at the Illmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies. He is also an ICAS fellow. Reach him at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.