New strategy on N. Korea
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By Tong Kim
With a third nuclear test on Feb. 12, North Korea has burnt its bridges, destroying the hope of denuclearization that the international community held onto for the past two decades and blowing up a chance for renewed inter-Korean engagement under the incoming administration in Seoul. The Korean Peninsula has become a hotter flash point.
It is clear now that the North would never give up its nuclear weapons. The North will keep developing a nuclear weapons deliverable capability that can target the United States beyond South Korea and Japan. Pyongyang claimed that the latest test was conducted with “the use of a smaller and lighter atomic device” and its nuclear deterrence “has become diversified.”
After a successful satellite launch in December, Pyongyang is going to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBMs) that can deliver miniaturized nuclear warheads. While it has not been confirmed that highly enriched uranium was used in the test, as insinuated by Pyongyang’s wording of “diversification of nuclear deterrence,” early data showed its yield has significantly improved by at least twice as much as the second test that yielded up to 7 kilotons.
The leadership in Pyongyang believes they must have a nuclear capability that can strike the United States as a deterrent to an attack from it and a means of survival. However, they also know any attempt by them to wage a first nuclear strike would be suicidal, as it could be preempted or massively retaliated against in an all-out war that would annihilate them.
In the aftermath of the latest nuclear provocation by the North, the voice of condemnation has echoed from the capitals around the world. As a minimum, there could soon be an additional sanction resolution from the U.N. Security Council, which may require a BDA-type action to deny Pyongyang’s access to international financial institutions or even a maritime blockade allowing forced inspections of North Korean vessels.
The problem is economic sanctions did not work in the past and a maritime blockade could run the risk of triggering armed clashes in the already volatile seas around the peninsula. China might support a stronger sanction, but it is not ready to cut off its lifeline to North Korea or to risk instability in Korea or the region.
In the meantime, an arms race has been spurred between the North and the South. While relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for an extended deterrent, the South has decided to go for an early deployment of missiles with a range of 800 kilometers that can reach all parts of the North. The South Korean military has just revealed its indigenous cruise missiles, which it says will be launched to strike the bases of provocation.
Mutual saber rattling is reaching its peak. Talk of redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to Korea and developing South Korea’s own nuclear weapons have resurfaced among conservative circles. President Lee Myung-bak told a daily last week that although the South going nuclear is not desirable now, he “respects the patriotism of those who demand the South’s own nuclear armament, as it would send a warning to China and North Korea.” The outgoing President still believes a North Korean collapse may come and the South should be prepared for it.
Incoming President Park Geun-hye said her government would never accept a nuclear North Korea, warning that “the North may crumble, if it keeps continuing its nuclear development.” Her national security chief, Kim Jang-soo, said her “policy of a trust building process” would have to be readjusted. For the time being, Park supports a strong international sanction.
Washington announced that it would seek “strong and credible measures” to punish Pyongyang’s provocation, and build a missile defense against the increasing North Korean threat. The U.S. Senate passed a bill on Feb. 14 that authorizes the U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific region to take appropriate measures against the North. The bill also tasks the State Department to submit a report to Congress by May 15 of its policy measures in response to the North Korean development of nuclear weapons and missiles.
The question is how Seoul and Washington, which have totally failed in denuclearization, can come up with a new comprehensive strategy to defuse tension and maintain peace in Korea, assure nonproliferation, and move toward an acceptable resolution to the North Korean issue. The North has abrogated all agreements of the Six-Party Talks and those with the South regarding denuclearization. The North claims it is exercising its sovereign right to defend itself with a nuclear deterrent from U.S. hostility.
Reinforcing the defense posture by the U.S.-ROK alliance has successfully deterred an outbreak of war, but it has not deterred provocations. It will not prevent further provocations, including additional nuclear tests and more missile launches. Preemptive military action would be difficult to carry out, as its effectiveness is questionable while it involves too much risk.
No South Korean wants war. Some argue that the only way to solve the nuclear issue is to bring about a regime change in the North to be followed by a democratic unification by absorption. However, neither Seoul nor Washington has any concrete plan to achieve it. President Lee believes China’s support is essential to this approach.
To create a new strategy, we should go back to the drawing board. We should analyze the causes of failure so far and assess the dynamics of an apparent advancement of North Korea’s military arsenal. The new strategy ought to be on a long-term basis to contain and manage the problem, while moderating North Korean behavior until a peaceful solution is found at the end. What’s your take?
The writer is a research professor at the Illmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies. He is also an ICAS fellow. Reach him at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.