Inter-Korean Relations 4.0

By Lee Chang-sup

After three and a half years of confrontation, inter-Korean relations seem to be moving toward dialogue and rapprochement.

In an unusual move, the state-controlled KBS has aired a series of public debates on unification. The subject appears too heavy in light of recent chilly South-North relations.

World-renowned maestro Daniel Barenboim will bring the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra to the Imjin Peace Park near the DMZ, for an inter-Korean peace concert next week. MBC organized the program. Without prior consultation with the government, the TV stations might not have planned the untimely programs.

Signs of the South-North thaw can also be detected on multiple fronts. In the recent Asian Regional Forum in Bali, Indonesia, foreign ministers from the two Koreas met. North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan met Washington’s point man Stephen Bosworth to discuss the six-party talks in New York. Korean-Americans in the U.S. will reportedly be allowed to meet their families in the North. The North has stopped demonizing and ridiculing President Lee Myung-bak as a puppet or a gangster.

Indications are that President Lee is likely to unveil his new proposal on inter-Korean relations during his Liberation Day speech Aug. 15.

South-North Relations 1.0-4.0

The South-North relations have gone through wild gyrations of clashes and dialogue since the 1953 ceasefire following the Korean War.

A historical review shows that inter-Korean relations have gone through three phases of ups and downs. During the South-North relations 1.0 period from 1953 to 1991, the Koreas were unable to move outside the confrontational framework, with the world’s superpowers ― the United States, the former Soviet Union and China ― in Cold War mode.

Former President Kim Dae-jung and his successor Roh Moo-hyun adopted inter-Korean relations 2.0 from 1998 to 2007.

The liberal leaders engaged the North. Noteworthy is the blessing of the United States, Russia and China.

However, the South’s unrequited love affair alienated the South Korean voters and raised the voice of hawkish conservatives as Pyongyang pursued nuclearization.

Conservative President Lee has fundamentally changed the course of the relations since 2008. He set preconditions that the North was unable to accept. In the wake of the sinking of the South Korean Navy ship Cheonan and the North’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island last year, the Koreas were on the brink of war.

Pyongyang even divulged what working-level officials had discussed behind the scenes, an indication that its distrust of the South had reached its peak. This period of renewed confrontation can be called Inter-Korean Relations 3.0. During the 2.0-3.0 period, the South experimented with the North in accordance with the ideological inclinations and whims of liberal and conservative leaders.

Now the Koreas must enter the 4.0 period of their relations. Under 4.0, the South should not play the North Korea card for domestic politics and voters.

The South should chart a consensus road map on inter-Korean relations in a consistent, less-emotional and bipartisan way. The blueprint should outlast the leaders. Under 4.0, the Koreas must be in detente mode, with the ultimate goal of reunification in mind. But it takes two to tango. The South could be principled in its approach toward the North. It can link aid to the North’s behavior. Pyongyang’s nuclear tests or provocations will lead to suspension of aid from the South. Seoul’s principled assistance to Pyongyang will help the South ultimately save in costs for rebuilding in a reunified Korea.

In the South, conservatives should refrain from castigating liberals as blind followers of or sympathizers with the communists. Liberals should stop branding conservatives as war mongers. In the 4.0 era, South Koreans need to overcome their wasteful and fruitless ideological feuding. The South Korean government needs to adopt a policy of separating the government from the private sector in communication with the North. Even in times of inter-Korean tension, the private sectors should be able to communicate with each other.

Seoul also needs diplomacy, in order to convince the key powers, including the United States, China, Russia and Japan, that a reunified and denuclearized Korea will not be a threat. Without understanding and sympathy from these powers, it is a remote idea for the Koreas to harbor thoughts of ultimate reunification.

In recent South-North clashes, the United States and China have played the roles of stabilizers of the Korean Peninsula. The United States sent a clear message to China and the North, by siding with the South. China blindly stood behind the North, but it also sent a clear message to the South and the United States that it does not want a war.

Without the buffer role of the United States and China, the two Koreas might have gone to war last year.

Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Lee Myung-bak have one thing in common: They tried to manage the division of the Korean Peninsula, not reunification, in different ways.

Under South-North Relations 4.0, the South should adopt a North Korea policy with ultimate reunification in mind. The next South Korean president should adopt a consensus-based North Korea policy, not relying on his or her personal ideology.

As capitalism evolves in economically uncertain times, so inter-Korean relations can mutate. The Koreas should stop ridiculing, deriding and demonizing each other. They need to think outside the box.

Lee Chang-sup is the chief editorial writer of The Korea Times. He can be reached at editorial@koreatimes.co.kr.