Growing fear in North Korea

By Lee Byong-chul

The pattern of rapid but orderly turnover of leaders initiated by Tunisia has already become a political phenomenon common in many other states in the Middle East. In addition, fear and doubt have started ricocheting around one remote country in Northeast Asia, which is slowly but steadily moving toward the end of its history.

The timing is particularly auspicious as reports of North Korean people starving in the midst of a food crisis again come thick and fast. The dramatic collapse of the corrupt Mubarak regime in Egypt must have stunned the North Korean elite, not to mention Kim Jong-il, the insolent dictator ruling through harsh means over a population suffering from severe hunger.

Maybe one could have anticipated this finale. North Korea has lost many of its allies, which has dealt it a severe political blow.

Upon hearing of the departure of President Hosni Mubarak who found himself powerless against the demonstrations, North Korea's brutal leader must have been quickly surrounded by his devoted aides and loyalists in panic and confusion. It's because all members of the ruling elite are virtually in the same boat through a system of hereditary ties and family associations.

Around the shocked elite the political situation appears darkened. While Mubarak and his family made a hasty departure with the help of his adherents, North Korea is increasingly becoming unsafe for Kim and his cronies. It is no secret that his fate has been much discussed within and outside the country.

For years there have been whispers of conspiracies against the ailing leader, talk that well predated this day. On April 22, 2004, a train explosion at Ryongchon was reportedly aimed at assassinating Kim, only to kill 160 people and injure 1,300. Most recently, there was an unconfirmed report that on Feb. 18, public unrest took place in the city of Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province. The small-scale demonstration was allegedly caused by security authorities cracking down on open-air markets, eventually leading to the deaths of three to four people while others were injured.

It is in any event a season of hard times for Kim who was named dictator for life and wants to be a living god in his country. With the fear that his regime might be dismantled, Kim is perfectly capable of maligning a man one day and swearing eternal devotion to him the next.

Otherwise, the man is eliminated.

The ruthless and charismatic Kim has an astonishing talent for plucking drops of water from dried towels in terms of removing his opponents. Yet the 70-year-old pharaoh does not fully recognize that the wind of change is at his back in that like his father, Kim Il-sung, the “Great Leader,” who died of a heart attack in 1994, Jong-il has always lived his life with one eye on posterity, possibly to soon celebrate his son's ascension.

Having stood at center stage of the monolithic North Korean politics for more than 50 years, the Kim dynasty has refused to be sidelined. Jong-un, aged 28, the third and youngest son of Jong-il, is also ready to be drawn into power and fame. Other than Jong-nam, 40, Jong-il's eldest son and step brother Jong-un, does no one in the Kim family worry about how history might view that posting? In addition, Jong-il's wife, Kim Ok, and his younger sister Kyung-hee, all have too much taste for public affairs and too little for domestic ones. Kyung-hee's husband, Jang Sung-taek, is recognized as an official taster of the new regime in transition. Jang and Jong-un are like a pair of castanets.

In the meantime, it's not yet clear whether the North Korean military, the country's central institution, can maintain its absolute loyalty to the inexperienced young leader after Jong-il dies in the not too distant future. The military elite may affect diplomacy through their increasing role in the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile programs, given they, albeit still dyed-in-the-wool loyalists of the Juche ideology, in part allegedly have harsh words for the governing philosophy espoused by the “Dear Leader” ― “a confirmed lover of luxury” is the kindest term.

North Korea already declared 2012 as the year for the creation of a powerful and prosperous state, indoctrinating its people into emulating “revolutionary spirit, virtues, and fighting style of the Korean People's Army." By any standard, however, no one says that that goal looks achievable until after next year.

Toppling dictatorships is looking to become a global tradition. It is no coincidence that Pyongyang has heavily censored news of the uprisings, strongly indicating that the fragile regime is gripped by the fear that it could encounter the same fate as Mubarak.

With mounting developmental challenges, North Korea's economic disaster is an easy mark for regime change. It is likely that North Korea lashes Western influence and conspiracy, referring to the “rainbow revolutions” that toppled despotic regimes in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan a few years ago. In truth, however, regime change does not need the preconditioned text, clearly evidenced in Egypt.

Dictators, it's often said, rarely die in bed. What sort of political system will emerge in North Korea is hard to predict at the moment. But regime change is too expensive. The feudal Kim dynasty now has little choice but to insert itself dangerously into a bloody struggle in Pyongyang, called the “capital of a great revolution,” even for its “orderly” final rest. Often used as a military parade for goose-stepping soldiers, thus, Pyongyang should be a Tahrir Square, not a Tiananmen Square.

Either way, continued gathering and analysis of intelligence on the whereabouts of the uncertain Kim regime will be necessary to get a clear understanding of the post-Kim system and to guide decision-making in choosing what course of action to take and what to avoid.

Lee Byong-chul is senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Cooperation, a nonpartisan policy advisory body based in Seoul. He can be reached at bcleebc@gmail.com. The views expressed in the above article are those of the author and do not reflect the editorial policy of The Korea Times.