No solution in sight
By Tong Kim
After the breakdown of working-level inter-Korean military talks on Feb. 9, it became more difficult to predict when the North might come back to hold dialogue with the South or if they would at all. Now it is uncertain when the opportunity might come to create the right conditions to resume the long stalled six-party talks, still viewed as the best forum to deal with the North Korean nuclear programs.
Apparently, the South Korean delegates were caught off guard when their counterparts walked out on the second day of the talks, because the North had appeared eager to move forward to higher-level talks. Until that point, they had been negotiating an agenda, a timeline and a level of representation for higher-level military talks, but without any agreement.
Of the three items for negotiation, disagreement on the agenda turned out to be the main cause for the breakdown. In a ``bulletin” posted on the Korea Central News Agency, the North Korean military said there is ``no need to deal with the South any more, since the South Korean traitor group did not want improved relations but continuation of confrontation and collision.” The North blamed the South’s intransigent stance regarding the two incidents of provocation for which the North denies any responsibility.
The Seoul government says the door to military talks is still open, if the North accepts the agenda that the South proposed to discuss: (1) responsible measures for the sinking of the Cheonan navy ship and the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island and (2) prevention of future provocations. The North claimed that they proposed an additional agenda item: ``tension reduction on the Korean Peninsula or prevention of any military action that could be regarded as provocation against each other.”
If the North Korean agenda was accepted, it would open an opportunity to bring up a series of issues, including the dispute over the Northern Limit Line (NLL) and combined exercises by the U.S.-ROK armed forces such as Key Resolve, Foal Eagle, and Ulchi Freedom Guardian that the South does not want to discuss for good reason. Yet, if the North Koreans are serious, they should agree to confirm the usefulness of the North South Non-Aggression Pact of 1991.
Even before the talks, few had expected the North to accept the responsibility for the explosion of the Cheonan or for its artillery attack on the island in the West Sea. The North Koreans said all along that it would only express its views on the issues. Even if high-level military talks were held, their best outcome would be some agreement to prevent future incidents of a provocative nature, which would not be satisfactory for the Seoul government. However, if the talks produce a creative, negotiated expression regarding the two sticking points that can be interpreted to each side’s advantage to save face for both, it might contribute to the furthering of inter-Korean dialogue.
In the meantime, it is not clear that the North’s overall dialogue offensives, which they waged aggressively in all directions since the Obama-Hu summit in mid January, have come to a halt. Even with China’s political and economic support, North Korea is struggling for survival from a dual crisis of leadership succession and economic impoverishment. Kim Jong-il has just celebrated his 69th birthday, handing out gifts to the hungry people reportedly the least in amount and value to date.
Yet, militarily North Korea is becoming more threatening. North Korea maintains an active nuclear program, with a conservative estimate of six to eight bombs and a disclosed uranium enrichment plant that could later provide a new source of fissile material. The latest revelation of North Korea’s missile program has confirmed that the North had built another, more modern launching site near the Chinese border, to shield it from possible pre-emptive attack from the United States.
Recent U.S. warnings ― from security and intelligence leadership, including the defense secretary, combatant commanders and national intelligence chief ― suggest that the North Korean nuclear and missile programs impose a direct threat to the security of the United States and its allies and should be heeded in two ways. Such warnings could be taken as a reverse warning to the North that the United States will not let them keep developing dangerous weapons of mass destruction without punishment. On the other hand, the warnings could be taken as public recognition of the North’s capabilities, which would be a welcome to the North Koreans.
Many experts in government and private organizations are saying more provocations are on their way. Future provocations may come in the form of another missile firing using the new launch pad for which 10 years were invested to build, or another nuclear test to improve devices since their second test in May 2009. Whereas preparations for these tests would be detectable, there are few operable measures to prevent them.
Perhaps, a more likely type of provocation would be a surprise attack by North Korean Special Forces on any target they choose. However, in view of the fact that the North experienced no gains but bad publicity and condemnation, and considering Pyongyang’s internal complications, it is not likely the North would launch another attack, unless it becomes desperate. The situation in the North has not reached a point to ignite an all-out suicidal attack.
The Seoul government wants to believe the only way to deter North Korean provocation and to change the North is strengthening defense posture and maintaining a consistent policy of principles. However, experience shows that deterrent alone does not prevent provocation and the government’s hard-line policy or international sanctions did not change North Korean behavior. It does not seem that the North will collapse soon.
Is there a better way to resolve the North Korean issue than smart engagement? Anyway, there would not be serious government-to-government talks for a while. What’s your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.