Debate on dialogue
By Tong Kim
I am writing this column just days before the holding of working-level military talks between the North and South on February 8. Frankly, I am getting tired of writing about North Korea, as it entails an endless cycle of hope, frustration, and threats, without the prospect of a satisfactory solution. After writing this column for more than five years now, I don’t want to sound like a broken record, telling the same old story. Yet, I keep writing because I think it is important to share objective views on the issue of war and peace that affect the lives of all Koreans.
If the scheduled military meeting at Panmunjeom successfully agree on an agenda for defense ministerial talks, it would provide an opportunity to discuss responsibility for the torpedoed ship, the Cheonan, and North Korea’s artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island, and to further agree on measures to prevent similar provocations in the future. If minister-level defense talks also succeed, it may lead to the resumption of dialogue between the authorities of both sides to tackle such fundamental issues as denuclearization and inter-Korean cooperation.
Given the long record of North Korea’s behavior and negotiating style, it is not difficult to predict some outcomes of the working-level military talks. The North will never accept responsibility for the sinking of the South Korean Navy ship. It will probably repeat its proposal to conduct a joint review of the results of last year’s international investigation regarding the ship’s explosion. On the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, the North is likely to deny its presumably premeditated attack. The North will insist that they were provoked to attack the island by the South side’s intentional disregard of their warnings.
As a preventive measure, the North is likely to propose a settlement of the unresolved issue of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), which ostensibly is the root cause of trouble in the West Sea. However, it is possible for the North: (1) to agree to avoid future armed clashes, and (2) to agree on a language that expresses North Korea’s regret over the sinking of the Cheonan in the disputed waters of the West Sea and its condolences to the military and civilian victims in the two deadly provocations. The North has already expressed regret over the civilian deaths on the island.
From the perspective of the Lee Myung-bak government, to move into talks with the North is a complicated issue of domestic and international politics. The government, basically, does not trust the North for good reason, and in the wake of the North’s deadly attacks, it has increased its military capability and fostered closer cooperation with its allies the United States and Japan as the best deterrent to future North Korean provocations. Seoul’s North Korea policy focuses more on unification than on reconciliation. Rightly, it is still preparing for a sudden change in the North, although it seems to depend much less on collapse theories.
The North has again switched to an all-out peace offensive to pressure the South. Last week, the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly proposed inter-Korean parliamentary talks to the South Korean National Assembly, while major North Korean political and social organizations also sent letters to their comparable South Korean organizations, asking them to ``come out to talks.” The South Korean opposition parties maintain a favorable attitude to such a North Korean move.
In an international context, the Seoul government has been feeling pressure from Washington and Beijing, especially since Obama’s recent agreement with Hu Jintao to require North-South dialogue to proceed with the restarting of six-party talks. Seoul does not want to be seen as imposing an obstacle to nuclear talks. At the same time, it does not have great expectations from the talks with the North. In view of Washington’s inconsistent North Korea policy, it is understandable that Seoul is concerned about the possibility that Americans might again move ahead of South Koreans, despite Washington’s repeated assurances that it would not do so.
The pronounced position of the Lee government on North Korea officially remains the same, which is: (1) to pursue ``coexistence and co-prosperity” through engagement, (2) to resolve the issue of denuclearization through negotiation, and (3) to provide economic aid as the North opens up. The North Korean regime also maintains in this regard, it will be ready: (1) to resolve the nuclear issue in the six-party talks, (2) to improve relations with the South for economic cooperation, and (3) to work with the South for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Recently, the North said it is ready to discuss all issues of concern to the South, including denuclearization, a topic Pyongyang always insisted to discuss only with Washington. On the other hand, the South suspects that the North’s ulterior motive for the latest dialogue offensive is a desperate attempt to free itself from international condemnation and sanctions. The South has a clear advantage in negotiation leverage in terms of its resources to help the bankrupt economy of the North.
Obviously, one of the urgent needs for dialogue that the North has is to obtain economic aid from the South. Before its two deadly provocations, the North had tried hard but failed to seek a summit meeting with the South. Last week President Lee said he would hold a summit ``if necessary,” hoping that the North demonstrates a willingness to change its pattern of provocations at the coming military talks.
It would be difficult for Seoul to accept the North’s proposition that inter-Korean engagement continue, as if nothing deadly had happened. It is also difficult to completely close the window of opportunity for dialogue. There is an ongoing debate on the utility or the futility of talks with the North, bilateral or multilateral.
Negative views are based on the widely recognized assumption that the North would never give up its nuclear weapons through negotiation as it is geared to become a full nuclear weapons state in 2012. Opponents of dialogue also argue, even if talks were aiming for tension reduction and crisis management, that they would not guarantee the end of the North’s provocative behavior based on its past record. They believe deterrent and containment are the best way.
Yet, proponents of talks believe dialogue would contribute to de-escalation from last year’s confrontation and crisis, and that it is better to have dialogue than none, even if its goal is limited to restoring stability. Such talks could also complement the trilateral approach of the U.S., South Korea and Japan to keep sanctions, surveillance, and containment in place, with an increased deterrent. Talks would enable the allies to confirm the intensions of the North and to learn reliable information about their nuclear program.
Now, it is up to the Seoul government to decide on a new path of dialogue that could change the dynamics of inter-Korean relations as well as the course of denuclearization. What’s your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.