Time to draft N. Korean Constitution

By Joseph Seung Hong

The arrival of the new U.S. Congress brings yet another blow to stateside efforts to address North Korea’s egregious human rights record, widely considered one of the worst in the world.

During his recently completed tenure in the Senate, Kansas’s new Gov. Sam Brownback displayed the traits of a rare breed of politician as a champion for human rights worldwide. Now, literally a handful of House members remain standing with a fractured human rights coalition.

Nonetheless, the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission held just one hearing addressing the North Korean refugee crisis, an issue that disproportionately affects children and women (most of whom sold into the Chinese sex trade), since its inception in early-2009.

And Congress remains largely silent or equivocal on: (1) the absence of the freedoms of speech, assembly, and movement, (2) massive food insecurity caused by deliberate, gross mismanagement, (3) the repressive state security apparatus, including a network of political prison camps where an estimated 200,000 prisoners currently languish and 400,000 have perished under such conditions as forced abortions, starvation-level rations, torture, and execution.

Like the previous administration, the Obama government has not fully implemented the North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA, became public law in October 2004), a document that, if implemented and integrated into policy toward North Korea, could realize incremental grassroots and political change.

For example, Section 103(a) states: “The United States should facilitate the unhindered dissemination of information in North Korea by increasing its support for radio broadcasting to North Korea … with a goal of providing 12-hour-per-day broadcasting.” This “facilitation” remains underfunded and broadcast on easily-jammed shortwave.

Another example is that since his belated appointment in November 2009, U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Robert King has not submitted a report detailing his activities in fulfillment of his annual reporting requirement to Congress. It is interesting to see that a full-time envoy could be this delinquent.

Outside of government, conditions do not fare much better. For the last decade, North Korean human rights policy recommendations from the human rights sector (e.g., Amnesty International, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch) have remained ineffective and irrelevant. Recommendations, such as “persuading China to respect the rights of North Korean refugees,” have been recycled ad nauseam to no avail.

Consequently, first, we must operate under the assumption that no amount of moral or international legal suasion will change China’s policy of hunting down and forcibly repatriating North Koreans.

Second, the past two decades ― particularly with the increase of repression before, during, and after the 2008 Beijing Olympics ― should perhaps teach the world that it is a fool’s errand to rely solely on the argument that China must reform its bad behavior in order to join the international community, especially on issues that infringe on its stated sovereignty.

Third, international law and existing multilateral fora have proven to be ineffective in their decades-old failure to protect refugees and quell human rights abuses in both China and North Korea.

Fourth, it may also be an exercise in false hope to argue that bilateral human rights dialogues or a coordinated alliance of liberal democracies could actualize progress on China’s human rights violations and material support of repressive regimes, because these may never realistically materialize (on the other hand, the international community could possibly work with China to simultaneously save face and end human rights violations).

To sum up, the preceding points should perhaps be foundational hypotheses for the re-orientation of human rights research in the coming decade unless, of course, limited documentation of abuses is satisfactory.

Next, the activist community is underfunded, fractured, and crippled by its own design.

Over the last decade, parochialism, egocentrism, and a preoccupation with retaining control over tiny nonprofit kingdoms (most notably displayed by the Korean Church Coalition) have obstructed the formation of a true coalition. If united perhaps we could finally witness the mobilization of the moral agency and fundraising capacity not only among Korean Americans and faith-based communities, but also of the American public in general.

Perhaps then, K Street could take on a different meaning. On a related note, the combined annual revenue in 2008 for five major nonprofits dedicated solely to North Korean human rights did not even break $1.2 million (even before the economic meltdown, combined annual revenues fell well below this sum), a paltry sum for conducting nationwide awareness-building programs, advocacy, and/or field operations.

Moreover, while activists have relied mainly on awareness events ― as vital as annual galas, rallies, vigils, and one-day Hill advocacy events are ― groups ought to also incorporate other more practical means. That is, limited awareness efforts have not directly translated into any votes, funding for political candidates, and political pressure to fully implement NKHRA. The building of a true coalition could accomplish these, and much more.

Finally, Operational Plan 5029 ― the U.S. and South Korean contingency plan for a regime collapse and disaster scenarios, which among other things prepares for the securing of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the establishment of regional peace and stability ― deserves at least some critical oversight from Congress and scrutiny from the human rights community. First, it seems possible that a North Korean insurgency, utilizing guerrilla and terrorist tactics, could arise.

It is unclear that South Korean political and military leadership is prepared to deal with this contingency or is capable of implementing counter-insurgency strategy and lessening the influence of juche (self-reliance) ideology, the North Korean regime’s structural ideology. This would perhaps result in a catastrophic number of noncombatant casualties and a prolonged conflict that could otherwise be avoided.

Second, it is unclear that South Korea has the civil society resources to adequately deal with such challenges as: the closure of political prisons, the rehabilitation of former prisoners, the documentation of atrocities for posterity and for indictments for crimes against humanity, the protection of historical sites and the contemporary material record, massive environmental remediation, and a culturally sensitive reconstruction.

Lastly, it is time to draft a preliminary North Korean Constitution in order to prevent the establishment of a paleo-colonial state in the name of free market growth and reunification. That is, while a North Korean Marshall Plan and economic growth would be key to the welfare of North Koreans and regional stability, places such as the Gaeseong Industrial Park should serve as indications that Chinese, Russian, and South Korean companies will most likely massively exploit cheap North Korean labor and natural resources with impunity.

Additionally, it is doubtful that South Korea has adequately considered ways to prevent conditions leading to the mass exploitation or marginalization of vulnerable groups, specifically women, children, and religious minorities.

For the sakes of the millions of lives already cut brutally short over the past six decades, let us hope that we can restock stateside efforts to one day see a North Korea in which liberty reigns and human dignity is protected.

The writer is a human rights advocate and a student of ethics at Wesley Theological Seminary in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at hong.joseph.s@gmail.com.