Is peaceful unification possible?

By Tong Kim

Aug. 15 last week marked the 65th anniversary of the national division of Korea that the Korean people did not want, following the liberation from Japanese colonial rule at the end of World War II. At this point in history, it would be futile to revisit the origin of the division or to blame those foreign powers responsible. However, it is still useful to discuss whether peaceful unification is achievable or even desirable.

The regimes of the North and South have since their establishment regarded reunification as the highest policy goal. The North Korean communists unsuccessfully tried to unify the Korean Peninsula by a brutal all-out attack 60 years ago. In theory, unification by force may still be possible, but another war is unthinkable to any sane mind.

To the North Korean leaders, peaceful unification used to mean a non-violent Communist takeover of the South. Now they know it would be impossible to subvert its free democratic neighbor, which has become the world’s 15th most thriving economy. With a per-capita income of $20,000 ― as compared to $1,000 for the North ― the people of the South are not vulnerable, nor gullible, to North Korean political propaganda.

Despite the colossal failure of the North Korean system to provide its people with the basic needs of living, it has developed a threatening military capability, including missiles and nuclear weapons. Despite evident signs of political and economic trouble, its exact doomsday is unknowable as yet. Perhaps, North Koreans survive hunger, starvation and suppression because of their unique national tenacity.

The successive governments of the South all had their versions of a path to ``peaceful democratic unification,” which is no doubt the desire of the people and it is prescribed in the Korean Constitution. The North regards ``democratic unification” as absorption by the South. What the North should understand is the rhetoric aspect of the phrase, as they also advocate unification under their terms.

Many people realistically hope that both sides peacefully coexist without threats and provocation so that they can go about their lives without worrying about security concerns. In this sense, former President Kim Dae-jung’s policy of peace and cooperation was in the right direction. Kim pursued not absorption, but reconciliation and cooperation based on a strong alliance with the United States. The North responded favorably to this approach. Some argue that Kim just wanted to deliver freebies to the North without reciprocity. This charge is still debatable.

President Lee Myung-bak last Wednesday announced his own three-stage path to eventual unification ― the first to form ``a peace community” prefaced by denuclearization, the second to develop an ``economic community” based on exchanges and cooperation, and the third to build a ``community of the nation,” which will lead to ultimate unification. Lee is also calling for ensuing freedom and basic rights for all North Koreans as well.

A ``unification tax” was also proposed by Lee. He said unification may come suddenly, and the South must be prepared for it, by raising funds to pay for the cost of unification. According to one government estimate, to meet the financial expenses for post unification requirements until 2040, the government would need about $2,140 billion, which would be roughly twice as much as South Korea’s GDP.

The North denounced President Lee’s proposal upon announcement as ``an all-out confrontation scheme by the South Korean traitors.” What the North is reacting to is, as it did to Lee’s policy of ``denuclearization and opening 3000,” the proposal requires denuclearization first, and in addition it calls for ``freedom and basic rights” for all people in the North. In other words, it sounds like the South would not do much unless North Korea gives up its nuclear programs.

Also there is no freedom in North Korea. To the North Korean leaders, allowing freedom to its people would mean an end to their system. The idea of a ``unification tax” seems to prepare for the cost of absorption by the South ― as in the case of Germany ― when the North collapses. The South Korean President said, ``Unification will happen.” That sounded like talking about a sudden collapse of North Korea.

Nobody would disagree with the Lee government’s emphasis on the deterrence of North Korean provocation and pressure for denuclearization. How to achieve denuclearization is something else. Unless we want to wait for a North Korean collapse, there will be no progress on denuclearization. Given the increased tensions and deteriorated relations with the North, it is unlikely that nuclear talks will take place in the near future. Washington is not doing anything to pave a way for dialogue either.

The recent reports that Chinese nuclear envoy Wu Dawei’s visit to Pyongyang produced an agreement that North Korea would seek preliminary talks with Washington and join an informal meeting of representatives of the six-party talks should be interpreted as China’s effort to contribute to stabilize the peninsula. Now that the aftermath of the Cheonan incident has not been cleared, the six-party talks may not resume this year, unless Pyongyang or Seoul or Washington changes its mind.

Korean unification is an important issue, but it is becoming more and more like rhetoric on both sides of Korea. Having lived divided for two thirds of a century, many South Koreans consider peace and stability more important than unification. A way forward would be to resume inter-Korean dialogue and amend relations to live peacefully together with North Koreans.

Even at the peak of improved inter-Korean relations during the previous governments, it was envisioned that complete national unification could only follow a long period of coexistence, during which neither side should threaten the other. The status of a ``national confederation” or an ``economic community” may last indefinitely in the form of one state with two systems. The people would be gradually allowed to communicate and visit with each other.

If the North changes down the road, it should be seized as an opportunity to pursue the interest of all Koreans. What’s your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.