Deciphering UNSC statement

By Tong Kim

The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) adopted a presidential statement on the Cheonan incident on July 9, which fell far short of meeting Seoul's initial expectation of a stronger and clearer condemnation of North Korea for attacking the South Korean ship. The statement did not blame North Korea directly. The statement was much nuanced and balanced that Seoul and Pyongyang respectively claimed each was vindicated. Pyongyang appears to be more pleased than Seoul with the UNSC statement.

Nevertheless, the Security Council called for both Koreas to take ``appropriate and peaceful measures against those responsible for the incident aimed at the peaceful settlement of the issue." Again, ``those responsible" were not identified in terms of nationality. Seoul had hoped for a U.N. demand for North Korea's apology and punishment of those North Koreans responsible for the sinking of the ship

The UNSC statement seems to have been based on shared concerns between China and the United States ― albeit they increasingly compete more openly in the region ― that escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, if unchecked, would jeopardize peace and stability in the region. The two giant powers do not want their allies in the North and the South to take any further actions that may lead to an uncontrollable security situation. While China stresses stability on the peninsula, the United States fully supports Seoul's position and commends South Korea's restraint in responding to the North Korean provocation.

Not fully accepting, but ``in view of" the findings of the South Korea-led investigation, ``which concluded that the DPRK was responsible, the Security Council expressed its deep concern." The Council also ``took note of the responses from other relevant parties, including from the DPRK, which has stated that it had nothing to do with the incident." The statement also ``deplored the attack that led to the sinking of the Cheonan."

``Other relevant parties" obviously also included China, which did not accept the conclusion of the South Korean investigation and Russia which reportedly had told the United States and China that it was not convinced that the attack was launched by North Korea. Some observers argue China could not openly discredit Kim Jong-il as an outright liar after he told Hu Jin tao during his China visit in April that the North was not involved. China's position also reflected its geostrategic interest in North Korea. In a separate sentence, which appeared semantically out of order, the Security Council also ``condemned" the attack that took 46 lives.

Washington also made a spin job out of what was only inferred in the UNSC's statement. Secretary Clinton flatly asserted, ``the U.N. Security Council's condemnation of North Korea's attack sends a clear message that such irresponsible and provocative behavior will not be tolerated." The White House NSC claimed, ``Today's U.N. Security Council Presidential statement condemns the attack by North Korea on the Cheonan and warns North Korea that the international community will not tolerate such aggressive behavior against the Republic of Korea. The unanimous statement, reflecting the shared view of the five members of the Six-Party Talks, constitutes an endorsement of the findings of the Joint Investigative Group that established North Korea's responsibility for the attack."

Although not exonerated by the UNSC, North Korea started moving fast. Its U.N. ambassador hailed it as ``a diplomatic victory," and Pyongyang's foreign ministry announced in an interview format with KCNA that North Korea was willing to return to six-party talks to conclude a peace treaty and denuclearization through negotiation ``on equal footing."

Pyongyang's spokesman said his country takes note of the statement that ``the Security Council encourages the settlement of the outstanding issues on the Korean peninsula by peaceful means to resume direct dialogue and negotiation through appropriate channels." This part of the statement can be construed as to include the six-party talks and direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang as well as inter-Korean dialogue. However, some insist that ``direct dialogue" should exclude U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks. Others caution that there might be a rapid development toward the resumption of the six-party talks, while South Korea may not be ready for it.

On July 10, Seoul's own foreign ministry responded to Pyongyang's announced willingness to return to multilateral nuclear talks: ``Above all, North Korea must clearly show its commitment to denuclearization." The ministry also said North Korea should respect the spirit of the UNSC statement and admit its provocation. It is not clear how soon Seoul would be in the mood for dialogue.

The Seoul government is confronted with a number of tasks in the aftermath of its half-success of the Cheonan diplomacy, including assessment of diplomatic gains and losses at the Security Council, reevaluation of the effectiveness of its North Korea policy more in realist rather than normative international terms, and taking a new security initiative to prevent recurrences of similar provocations.

There are pros and cons on the postponement in transferring the wartime operational control until the end of 2015, a decision that was made after the Cheonan incident. One positive aspect of the decision would be that the United States would extend its direct deterrence against hostile military actions from and against the North.

Now that the UNSC diplomacy is over, what should Seoul do to strengthen its strategic and tactical posture against the North? Should Seoul start operating loud speakers in the DMZ? Should Seoul continue to ask for an aircraft carrier to participate in a combined naval exercise on the West Sea? Should Seoul plan for a PSI drill on waters south of Jeju Island? Should Seoul keep shunning the North? What's your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.