Military, diplomatic strife

By Tong Kim

This year's 6/25 marks the 60th anniversary of the North Korean attack on the South, which started a tragic fratricidal war that ended after claiming a couple of million lives yet without a clear winner and with the division of the peninsula remaining. The biggest lesson of the Korean War still stands today: there should never be another war.

Since the conclusion that the Cheonan corvette was torpedoed by North Korea, there have been some concerns about the possibility of more military provocations from the North. Many believe neither side can afford to let a second all-out war break out despite the continuing exchanges of belligerent rhetoric and hostile actions.

The North Korean leadership understands that a renewed war would lead to an end of its regime. President Lee asked the North to stop provocations for ``coexistence and co-prosperity," but the North does not trust him. Lee had also said he is ``not afraid of war but does not want it." Some argued that military retaliation should not be excluded as a punishment against the North. Their rationale was, ``Only those who are ready for war can prevent war."

This was a reminder of an adage by Admiral Turner Joy, who negotiated the Korean Armistice, and later wrote in his book ``How Communists Negotiate" in 1954, ``We must be prepared to accept the risk of war if we hope to avoid war." Joy rightly blamed Washington for its inconsistent Korea policy and unwillingness to fight the ``Red Chinese" with all the power the United States had. He regretted that Washington had missed the opportunity to unify Korea during the war. That was 57 years ago. Even afterwards, U.S. policy sometimes was part of the problem rather than the solution to the Korean issue.

Even today, deterrence to war is an immediate objective, and peaceful unification remains the goal of all South Koreans. The ROK-U.S. combined deterrence has failed to prevent North Korea's surprise, unconventional attack of the Cheonan frigate. The incident exposed the South's vulnerabilities in its defense posture. Since the incident, President Lee has lined up a new team of military generals, who all said they would take resolute action against further provocations.

All inter-Korean contacts and economic cooperation, except for the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, have been suspended. The ministry of national defense (MND) has reconstituted some loudspeaker systems in the DMZ, but their operations have not yet started. The North Korean People's Army threatened to destroy the systems if they are used. Pyongyang also renewed its threat to turn Seoul into ``a sea of fire." Seoul is threatened but not intimidated. It says it is ready to counter any future provocation. The MND announced the planning of a big scale U.S.-ROK naval exercise on the West Sea, in which a U.S. aircraft carrier would participate, but the timeline has already been postponed twice.

Delays on psychological operations and the naval exercise are seen in the context of Chinese sensitivity to a further increase of tensions on the peninsula and to a naval exercise right across from China's coastal lines. Seoul needs Beijing's support for a condemnation of the North at the United Nations. China chose not to take a clear position on the Cheonan issue, and China is clearly inclined to protect North Korea for its ``geopolitical interests" and its desire to avoid further trouble on the Korean Peninsula.

Last week's National Assembly hearings shed light on what the Seoul government is trying to do after President Lee's May 24 announcement of counter-measures. The government has undertaken a new agenda. First address the Cheonan issue ― until then there would be no efforts for denuclearization or inter-Korean relations. Second, concentrate on the diplomatic efforts to obtain a U.N. Security Council resolution or a presidential statement to censure the North. Third, keep working with the United States, and other cooperating countries to win the support of China and Russia and fourth, continue pursuing a strategy of waiting for a transformation of Pyongyang's policy, and sticking to the ``Opening 3000" program that requires denuclearization before undertaking economic cooperation.

Unlike the evasive China, Russia undertook a separate investigation of the Cheonan and is expected to announce its outcome soon. Russia, along with China, is likely to determine the fate of South Korean diplomacy at the U.N. Security Council. Russian President Medvedev requested a ``thorough investigation" after the Council had been briefed by a Seoul-led investigation team. The Council had also heard Pyongyang's disclaim. Medvedev was quoted by the Wall Street Journal as saying, ``Although only one version has been broadly circulated, we should not take it immediately for granted … (that) ``hypothesis" is one of the possible scenarios."

China would hope that Russia decides in favor of North Korea. Anyway, a final UNSC action is unlikely until after a Russian decision. UNSC action could be influenced by summit diplomacy among the leaders concerned, who are gathering in Canada for G-8 and G-20 meetings. If the UNSC fails to take action, it would mean Seoul's diplomatic failure.

Was it necessary for Seoul to take the issue to U.N. for a watered-down presidential statement against Pyongyang? Was it not enough to have solicited the solid support of some 56 countries, including the United States and the EU, whose parliaments adopted strong resolutions condemning North Korea, if Seoul's purpose was not to seek additional sanctions but to expose the provocation to the world and to denounce it?

However, it is not clear what exactly would satisfy Seoul's needs to move beyond the Cheonan. Seoul demands Pyongyang's apology and punishment of those responsible, and commitment to prevent recurrences. This may be a politically correct demand, but unrealistic to meet. Pyongyang seldom admits its provocations: it denies its involvement in the Cheonan incident, as it denied its responsibility in the 1989 explosion of a Korean Airliner and the 1983 bombing in Rangoon. What's your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.