No dialogue, no hope
By Tong Kim
Since the sinking of the ROK navy ship Cheonan, any chance of dialogue with North Korea, multilateral or inter-Korean, has quickly evaporated. A final investigation report of the incident will be released soon, possibly as early as this week. But, few experts expect the investigation to result in a smoking gun conclusion, beyond the identification of the torpedo used in the attack and perhaps circumstantial evidence supporting the involvement of a North Korean submarine.
Having witnessed several previous acts of terrorism by the North, it would be no surprise if the North turns out to be the perpetrator. The Seoul government seems to have assumed early on that the North was responsible for the tragic incident, although it has not yet formally announced such a conclusion. Conservatives in Seoul and Washington share the same stance to demand a tough reprisal against the North.
Washington's position was more cautious at the beginning. Washington supported Seoul's investigation, while putting a hold on the six-party talks and closely observed Kim Jong-il's recent visit to China. Now it is getting ready to determine what measures need to be taken in case North Korean involvement is proven. As a close ally, the United States is bound to respect Seoul's views on the Cheonan incident.
Seoul's military retaliation and closing of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex will likely be ruled out, whereas a number of other responses is being discussed: 1) seek more U.N. sanctions, 2) curtail trade with the North ― by suspending the South's import of North Korean fish and sand that is used for production of cement, 3) deny North Korean ships' passage through the Jeju strait, 4) strengthen deterrents against the North Korean Navy by building an anti-submarine capability, 5) conduct combined U.S.-ROK naval exercises on the West Sea, 6) revamp the security management system in the government ― which has already been undertaken, 7) delay the planned transfer of the wartime operation control beyond 2012, and 8) reinforce the ROK-U.S. alliance even at the cost of relations with China.
Some of these measures would require the support and cooperation of the United States, which will be influenced by the level of credibility and clarity of evidence showing North Korean culpability. China has stated that charges of the North's involvement are only press speculation, a clear message that it will not support a new U.N. sanction at the absence of indisputable evidence. Pyongyang has denied its involvement, but nobody believes it.
Proponents of engagement with North Koran do not condone the internally repressive and externally provocative behavior of the North Korean regime. Yet, they believe dialogue and diplomacy are still the best way to prevent a disastrous consequence of increasing confrontation with North Korea that has never yielded to pressure before. Every time the North undertakes a new provocation by rhetoric or action, it weakens the ground for the moderates and progressives to argue for dialogue and cooperation with the North Koreans.
On the other hand, more conservatives are becoming skeptical of the utility of the six-party forum for denuclearization. They firmly believe that Kim Jong-il will never abandon his nuclear weapons, because doing so would mean an end to his regime. They believe that regime change or collapse is the only answer. This group does not see the need for dialogue. They have confidence in the inevitable collapse of the North, sooner or later and in one way or another. Lately, they see more encouraging signs of the final demise.
In this connection, the most important conclusion to draw from the North Korean leader's China visit should be that he is healthy enough to stay in control and the doomsday has not yet approached. The press was wrong to have predicted Kim's announcement to return to the six-party talks in return for economic aid and China's blessing of a second father-to son succession. In short, it is highly unlikely to expect a North Korean collapse during the terms of Obama or Lee Myung-bak.
Both in Seoul and Washington, the voice of conservatives, including the so-called North Korea experts some of whom fall prey to Seoul's sophisticated lobbying efforts, seems to ring louder than ever before. There are some reasons: 1) Pyongyang has no friends or sympathizers in Washington who would speak for Pyongyang, 2) diplomacy for the past two decades - including eight years of six-party talks ― has failed to resolve the North Korean issue, 3) the engagement policy of the two previous Korean governments has been effectively criticized as a failure by conservative activists, and 4) the Cheonan incident has strengthened the position of the conservatives.
In Seoul, the Cheonan has aggravated the divide between progressives and conservatives. Progressive experts in North Korean affairs complain that they are not invited to conferences discussing the issue of the Korean Peninsula that are sponsored by government-supported organizations. In short, there is no exchange of views between the opposing schools of thought. The press is also divided between conservative and progressive views. Neither side publishes opposing views. Where there is no dialogue, there is no hope for a balanced view.
The progressives increasingly believe that the sure way to reverse the Seoul government's policy is to bring about a regime change in 2012. Many agree that will not be easy. What's your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.