Talking About Nuclear Talks

By Tong Kim

It has been a year since North Korea boycotted the six-party talks in reaction to the United Nations' punitive action against Pyongyang's rocket or missile launch. Since U.S. envoy Stephen Bosworth's visit to Pyongyang last December, Washington has shown no interest in talking to North Korea, waiting for its return to the six-party talks. Pyongyang has vowed not to return to the talks unless Washington commits to the discussion of a peace treaty and the lifting of sanctions.

There is no prospect of an imminent breakthrough to the deadlock, except the wishful expectation that Pyongyang may soon blink because of its insurmountable political and economic troubles at home. According to the latest scenario, favored in Washington and Seoul, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il would go to Beijing and announce his decision to return to the multilateral talks in return for China's pledge of further economic aid.

Last Saturday morning, there were conflicting news reports about Kim's arrival in Dandong. Yonhap News first reported that an armed train, possibly carrying Kim aboard had arrived in the Chinese border city. This report was quickly corrected by a Japanese news outlet, which claimed it had confirmed with the Dandong authorities that the train was not Kim''s train but a freight car.

These reports came one day after Assistant Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell said in Seoul that he had no knowledge of the timing of the Dear Leader's China visit. A few days earlier the Blue House had predicted that Kim's China visit was imminent.

In view of Chinese President Hu Jin Tao's plan to attend the Nuclear Security Summit, April 12-13 in Washington ― which will discuss the prevention of nuclear terrorism, and his subsequent travel to Brazil, Venezuela, and Chile, there is a narrow window for the North Korean leader's possible visit, if it is to occur soon.

The question is not whether or when Kim would visit Beijing, but what he would say if he does meet with the Chinese leaders. Somehow, Washington always hopes for Chinese cooperation ― to press or persuade the North to take steps towards the elimination of its nuclear weapons. There is no evidence so far that Kim has made up his mind to return to the talks, not to mention his decision to give up his nuclear weapons. More seriously, the North's return alone does not guarantee denuclearization.

As I wrote in this column before, the DPRK's foreign ministry statement of January 11, 2010 ― calling for U.S. agreement on talks for a peace agreement ― was Pyongyang's deliberated response to Bosworth's December visit to the North, in which the North Koreans recognized the importance of the six-party talks. They also demanded the lifting of U.N. sanctions, which they said forced them to leave the talks. In short, North Korea was proposing a second direct meeting with the United States to discuss these issues as a step towards the resumption of multilateral talks.

Washington refused the North Korean proffer, sticking to its ``strategic patience" in waiting for Pyongyang's return to the framework of six-party talks, within which Washington would be willing to address bilaterally and multilaterally all the issues of concern to the North.

The denuclearization of North Korea may not be an urgent priority for Washington because: (1) the North's limited nuclear arsenal without an effective delivery system is not directly threatening the security of the United States, whereas potential nuclear terrorism and Iran's nuclear development are more serious; (2) Washington keeps shared views and a comfort level of cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo in the approach to the North; (3) there are indications, although not decisive, for increasing instability in the North due to Kim's health problems, a succession process, as well as with an impending prospect of economic bankruptcy from the failed currency reform and the impact of the U.N. sanctions; and (4) even if a new agreement is reached with the current leadership of the North, implementation would be problematic as shown by experience, and there is no assurance that a successor regime would honor Kim's commitment, assuming complete denuclearization would take several years beyond the lifetime of Kim.

Although any in-depth discussion on the secretive North Korea largely depends on an academic exercise of speculation, the North Koreans are not inscrutable. Their fundamental strategy has been consistent in pursuing the protection of its independence, the survival of its system, and the improvement of the economy for its people. However, their tactics have varied in their continuing attempt to achieve these goals depending on a given situation, and their approach will shift or evolve again.

Time has proven that the utility of their nuclear programs is not for negotiation. They see it as a security deterrent against the external threats mainly from the United States, whom they accuse of keeping a hostile policy towards them. Under the ``Sun Gun" (military first) doctrine, Pyongyang may believe that its possession of nuclear weapons helps maintain military unity and domestic order during the courses of succession and economic revival.

Even if the multilateral talks were to resume soon, it would be only the beginning of a long thorny path to a negotiated settlement. Yet, with a bilateral form excluded, for the right or the wrong reasons, there is something Washington can and should do as a minimum in order to lure the North back to the Beijing talks. Either through the Chinese or directly, Washington should convince Pyongyang that it is not waiting for Kim's death or the downfall of his regime.

The North Koreans seem to prefer the conclusion of a peace agreement over the normalization of ties because it will end the state of war and it should last unless or until its adversary wants to go to war with them. In their view, a normalized relationship can be nullified by a unilateral notice, as it sometimes happens in international relations. In other words, normalization could be only ``a sheet of paper" that does not guarantee North Korea's security.

As for the efficacy of sanctions, all pundits and experts agree that sanctions will not have a full impact without China's aggressive participation. Hwang Jang-yup, the highest-ranking North Korean defector, told a Washington audience last week that North Korea would not collapse as long as China supports it. We still don't have enough or concrete evidence regarding the likelihood of a North Korean collapse.

China supports denuclearization because it does not want a destabilized Korean Peninsula. So far, the failure of multilateral efforts in denuclearization did not destabilize the region, albeit it may have increased tensions. China does not want the collapse of North Korea, because it would threaten its strategic interests, which coincides with the ``supreme interest" of North Korea's survival.

Once the paranoid North Korea is convinced of the assurance of its security and survival, it would be open to serious discussion for denuclearization. The task is how do we get there from here? What's your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.